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This thesis often references the loosely-knit terrorist group known as “al-
Qaeda,” meaning “the base” in Arabic.  Recognizing the grammatical error of 
using the English indefinite article ‘the’ before the Arabic indefinite article ‘al’, this 
study will nevertheless refer to the terrorist group as ‘al-Qaeda’ for the sake of 




























Immediately following the terrorist strikes of September 11, 2001, US 
policymakers and senior Department of Defense (DoD) leadership launched 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) to destroy the worldwide al-Qaeda terrorist 
network and topple the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.  Roughly 17 months later, 
the same US officials ordered the execution of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) to 
remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq.  US Army Special Forces infiltrated 
both Afghanistan and Iraq and in doing so provided the first US military boots on 
the ground in both conflicts.  The reliance of senior policymakers and DoD 
leadership upon Special Forces was unprecedented in its scope, ushering in a 
new era in Special Forces employment and operations.   
How did Special Forces successfully conduct operations against the 
Taliban, al-Qaeda and the Saddam Hussein regime?  Following Operation 
Desert Storm in 1991, US Army Special Forces underwent a subtle, yet critical 
change.  The wartime missions of special reconnaissance (SR), direct action 
(DA) and coalition support, transitioned to the post-conflict mission of foreign 
internal defense (FID) during Operation Provide Comfort1.  
Although always maintaining the capability to execute the five doctrinal 
missions of SR, DA, FID, unconventional warfare (UW) and combating terrorism 
(CBT), a great deal of Special Forces employment throughout the mid-1990s 
generally consisted of humanitarian-related missions supporting international 
organizations to ease human suffering and FID operations to aid friendly foreign 
governments.  Despite the maintenance of these “warrior skills” through constant 
training at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and National Training 
Center (NTC), policymakers chose to employ Special Forces units in non-
offensive roles.   
                                            
1 Following Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm in 1991, the US military conducted 
Operation Provide Comfort, providing humanitarian assistance to Kurdish refugees in northern 
Iraq.  Special Forces conducted the initial assessments of the situation in northern Iraq, 
establishing credibility with the ethnic Kurds that would influence the Kurdish decision to support 
the coalition effort in the north during Operation Iraqi Freedom.   
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The shift away from the post-Desert Storm non-lethal employment of 
Special Forces began with the decision to commit US military forces to Bosnia in 
late 1995.  Over the next seven years, in both Bosnia and Kosovo, the US 
Special Forces would conduct a variety of missions, effectively changing the 
perception of policymakers and military commanders, ultimately influencing their 
future employment.   
The US-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations in the 
Balkans between 1995 and 2001 provided the first long-term integration between 
Special Forces and conventional forces in US military history, allowing Special 
Forces and conventional forces to work together, in both a joint and coalition 
environment, and learn each other’s capabilities.  Special Forces initially served 
as liaisons with non-NATO troop contributing nations (TCN) in Bosnia, providing 
command, control and communications support in the complex operating 
environment.  Special Forces also commenced intelligence operations, working 
and living among the citizens of the various ethnic groups, providing NATO 
commanders with accurate assessments of the situation on the ground and rapid 
communications with influential political, social, religious and military leaders 
among the former warfighting factions (FWF).  During Operation Allied Force, 
Special Forces conducted SR in Bosnia and FID, providing intelligence and 
communications support for the Kosovo Liberation Army, operating from Albania 
against the Serb military.  As conventional commanders during the Kosovo Force 
(KFOR) mission in Kosovo grew more comfortable with their Special Forces, they 
slowly allowed the Special Forces soldiers to conduct higher-risk missions and 
intelligence operations.  
Unleashed by policymakers as the first US combat force on the ground in 
the opening days of OEF, Special Forces conducted aggressive UW and DA 
missions, leveraging indigenous forces and technology against al-Qaeda 
terrorists and the Taliban.  Working with tribal warlords and their militias, several 
hundred Special Forces soldiers contributed to the overthrow of the Taliban 
regime in less than two months and the loss of Afghanistan as a sanctuary to al- 
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Qaeda.  In support of the new Afghan government, Special Forces commenced 
an aggressive FID effort focused on counterinsurgency (COIN) to capture or kill 
former members of the Taliban and al-Qaeda terrorists.     
In Iraq, Special Forces elements manned two Combined/Joint Special 
Operations Task Forces (C/JSOTFs), conducting UW, DA and SR against the 
Iraqi military.  Unable to deploy conventional coalition units into northern Iraq, US 
Central Command (CENTCOM) infiltrated C/JSOTF-North into the Kurdish 
Autonomous Zone to conduct UW operations with the ethnic Kurds.  Leading 
Kurdish fighters and backed by formidable coalition air support, the Special 
Forces soldiers attacked and destroyed a terrorist enclave in northeastern Iraq 
suspected of manufacturing chemical weapons.  Following the destruction of the 
terrorist group, the Special Forces soldiers and their ethnic Kurd allies faced off 
against 13 conventional divisions, an estimated sixty-percent of the Iraqi military, 
along the forward edge of the battle area, known as the Green Line.  The US  
mission was to prevent the units from reinforcing Baghdad against the coalition 
main effort from the south.  Attacking to disrupt conventional Iraqi forces, Special 
Forces and the Kurds ultimately seized the key cities of Kirkuk and Mosul, forcing 
the surrender of the Iraqi V Corps.  Following the fall of the Saddam Hussein 
regime, Special Forces conducted COIN, utilizing techniques developed through 
their experience in the Balkans and Afghanistan to combat the growing Iraqi 
insurgency and lend stability to the fragile provisional government.    
A. STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION AND PURPOSE 
How have the operations conducted by US Army Special Forces evolved 
from the Balkans in 1995 through Operation Enduring Freedom to Operation Iraqi 
Freedom?  This thesis presents a historical analysis of the evolution of Special 
Forces operations from 1995 to 2004, focusing specifically on operations 
conducted in the Balkans (Bosnia and Kosovo), Afghanistan and Iraq.  This study 
demonstrates a causal relationship between the employment of Special Forces in 
the Balkans and subsequent operations during Operation Enduring Freedom.  
The thesis then builds upon the experience of Special Forces during OEF to 
explain the success of Special Forces operations in OIF.  The evolution of 
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Special Forces operations in the Balkans and lessons learned from those 
operations proved critical to the success of Special Forces in OEF and OIF.  
Tracing the evolution of Special Forces employment is critical to understanding 
the factors contributing to the success of Special Forces operations in both the 
combat and stability and support operations (SASO) phases of OEF and OIF as 
well as how Special Forces may be employed in future operations. 
B. METHODOLOGY  
This thesis presents a historical analysis of the evolution of SF operations 
through present day, beginning in the Balkans, in order to understand the impact 
of this evolution upon the success of operations in OEF and OIF.  Sources 
consist of open-source publications, unclassified material internal to DoD and 
interviews with both Special Forces and conventional soldiers that participated in 
operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq. 
C. ORGANIZATION  
This thesis investigates how the evolution of Special Forces operations 
during the 1990s led to their success in OEF and OIF.  To analyze the evolution 
of Special Forces from the Balkans to Iraq, this thesis is structured into four 
parts.  The first section provides an overview and analysis of Special Forces 
operations in the Balkans from 1995 to 2001.  The second section examines 
lessons learned by Special Forces from their Balkans experience.  The third 
section reviews Special Forces operations conducted during Operations 
Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.  The final section analyzes the overall 
evolution of Special Forces operations from the Balkans to Iraq, specifically 
examining why policymakers chose Special Forces for OEF and OIF, intelligence 
operations, the impact of UW and FID operations, the role of close air support, 
integration with conventional forces and the institutionalization of lessons learned 
by the Special Forces community.  The thesis concludes with an analysis of the 
future of Special Forces operations based upon lessons learned from OEF and 
OIF.    
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II. INTO THE BALKANS 
This thesis chapter surveys US Army Special Forces missions conducted 
in the Balkans between 1995 and 2001, answering the research question: What 
types of operations did Special Forces conduct in the Balkans (Bosnia, Albania, 
and Kosovo) from 1995-2001?  This chapter provides an overview of Special 
Forces operations in the Balkans and their task organization as it changed over 
the years.   
A. SETTING THE STAGE 
US Army Special Forces arrived in Bosnia as part of the Implementation 
Force (IFOR) led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on 20 
December 1995.  The 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), headquartered at 
Fort Carson, Colorado and regionally oriented to Europe, provided a preliminary 
force package of 240 personnel in support of Operation Joint Endeavor.2  During 
Operation Joint Endeavor, US Army Special Forces provided Liaison 
Coordination Elements (LCE) to non-NATO troop contributing nations (TCN).   
As IFOR transitioned to the Stabilization Force (SFOR) and Joint 
Endeavor became Operation Joint Guard on 20 December 1996, only two of the 
original LCE missions continued and US Army Special Forces assumed the Joint 
Commission Observer (JCO) operations from the British.  Special Forces may 
have additionally played a role in the apprehension of Persons Indicted For War 
Crimes (PIFWCs) in Bosnia, but due to the sensitivity of the topic, this paper will 
not address PIFWC operations in detail.  On 20 June 1998, as Operation Joint 
Guard became Operation Joint Forge, Special Forces continued their LCE and 
JCO missions until Operation Allied Force in 1999.   
 
                                            
2 Operation Joint Guard PowerPoint Briefing, Headquarters, 10th Special Forces Group 
(Airborne), Overview, December 1995-November 1996, date unknown, provided by Command 
Historian’s Office (Archives), US Army Special Operations Command (Airborne), Ft. Bragg, North 
Carolina, 26 February 2004.  NATO named the IFOR mission in Bosnia “Operation Joint 
Endeavor,” which lasted from 20 December 1995-20 December 1996.  
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NATO commanders employed Special Forces in several missions during 
Allied Force, including special reconnaissance (SR) and limited support to the 
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in Albania.  Following the cessation of hostilities, 
Special Forces operated extensively in Kosovo conducting LCE and Liaison 
Team (LT) missions in support of Operation Joint Guardian.  A comparison of 
Special Forces operations in Bosnia prior to Operation Allied Force with those in 
Kosovo following the conflict demonstrates a marked increase in the amount of 
risk which leaders allowed the Special Forces soldiers to take while conducting 
operations.  This trend will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter. 
Organized into 12-man operational detachments and cross-trained in 
critical skills, the Special Forces team split into two or three independent 
elements as dictated by mission requirements.  This flexibility for task 
organization provides Special Forces a unique capability as combat multipliers, 
unavailable to conventional units.  Special Forces may conduct five “doctrinal” 
missions.3   
                                            
3 The Five Doctrinal Special Forces Missions as defined in the SOF Posture Statement, 
2003-2004, United States Special Operations Command, p. 36: 
(1) Counterterrorism (CT): The primary Special Operations Forces (SOF) mission in the 
Global War On Terror (GWOT).  CT “involves offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, pre-
empt and respond to terrorism.” 
(2) Special Reconnaissance (SR): “Reconnaissance and surveillance missions conducted as 
special operations in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify 
information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally 
found in conventional forces.” 
(3) Direct Action (DA): “The conduct of short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive 
actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied or politically sensitive environments to 
seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover or damage targets of strategic or operational significance, 
employing special military capabilities.” 
(4) Unconventional Warfare (UW): “A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, 
normally of long duration.  UW is predominantly conducted by, with or through indigenous or 
surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying 
degrees by an external source.  UW includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low-
visibility, covert or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, 
sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery.” 
(5) Foreign Internal Defense (FID): “Participation by civilian or military agencies of a 
government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated 
organization to free their society from subversion, lawlessness and insurgency.”  
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B. US SPECIAL FORCES TASK ORGANIZATION-IFOR   
As US Army Special Forces personnel entered Bosnia with the IFOR on 
20 December 1995, IFOR activated its own Special Operations Command 
(SOCIFOR) and incorporated the existing non-US NATO Special Forces units 
previously supporting the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) into a 
multinational Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF).4 
IFOR exercised command of special operations through a Special 
Operations Command-IFOR (SOCIFOR) commanded by the 
Commander of Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR), 
US BG Canavan.  SOCIFOR established a Combined Joint Special 
Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) subordinate to the ARRC (Allied 
Rapid Reaction Corps) for the conduct of special operations in 
Bosnia.  This CJSOTF was initially commanded by British Brigadier 
General Cedric Delves.5 
SOCIFOR functioned as the US theater-level special operations command 
while the CJSOTF directly supported the Multinational Division (MND) 
commanders in IFOR through command and control of the British JCO teams as 
well as the US Army Special Forces Liaison Control Elements (LCE) deployed to 
support non-NATO Troop Contributing Nations (TCN).6 
C. US SPECIAL FORCES TASK ORGANIZATION-SFOR  
As the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) replaced IFOR on 20 January 
1996, the special operations task organization in Bosnia changed as well.  
SOCIFOR was “disestablished” and an American Special Forces officer took 
command of the CJSOTF as the US Land Forces Central (LANDCENT) 
assumed command from the ARRC.7  The CJSOTF functioned under the 
operational control (OPCON) of SFOR and assumed control of all special 
operations in Bosnia.  Subordinate to the CJSOTF was a US Army Special 
                                            
4 Charles T. Cleveland, Command and Control of the Joint Commission Observer Program-
US Army Special Forces in Bosnia, Strategy Research Project, US Army War College, Carlisle 
Barracks, Pennsylvania, USAWC Class of 2001, p. 5. 
5 Michael L. Findlay, Special Forces Integration with Multinational Division-North in Bosnia 
Herzegovina, A Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command 
and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 21 May 1998, p. 14. 
6 Findlay, Special Forces Integration. pp. 16-17. 
7 Cleveland, Command and Control. p. 6. 
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Forces Battalion headquarters, which in turn controlled a Special Forces 
company-level Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE)8.  
With the assumption of CJSOTF command by the United States, the JCO 
mission shifted from the British, who had pioneered the concept in 1994, to US 
Army Special Forces personnel.  The SOCCEs, under the Tactical Control 
(TACON) of MND commanders, directly controlled all US Special Forces 
personnel conducting the new JCO and few remaining LCE missions. 
D. US SPECIAL FORCES TASK ORGANIZATION-OPERATION ALLIED 
FORCE AND KOSOVO  
During Operation Allied Force, US Army Special Forces formed part of a 
Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) OPCON to United States 
Commander-In-Chief Europe (USCINCEUR) General Wesley Clark.  In addition 
to OPCON responsibilities, the JSOTF was under the tactical control (TACON) of 
Commander, Joint Task Force (COMJTF) Noble Anvil, Admiral Ellis.9  Once the 
situation stabilized in Kosovo, 3rd Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group 
(Airborne) sent a SOCCE into Kosovo as part of the US Multinational Brigade-
East (MNB-E), also known as Task Force Falcon (TF Falcon).  The SOCCE was 
OPCON to SOCEUR and TACON to MNB-E, controlling all US Special Forces 
personnel in Kosovo.10   
E. LIAISON COORDINATION ELEMENT (LCE) OPERATIONS 
(OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR) 
In 1995, while developing the initial NATO IFOR concept, planners 
recognized the need to “develop a liaison/advisory assistance capability for the 
non-NATO forces deploying with IFOR.”11  Several of the non-NATO countries  
                                            
8 Findlay, Special Forces Integration. p. 15.  The SOCCE, a Special Forces company 
headquarters, provides command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) to its 
subordinate Special Forces Operational Detachment Alphas (SFODA).   
9 Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Review, Report to Congress, 31 January 2000, 
CALL Database, Special Products, p. 20, Figure 3, Command Structure, January-July 1999 (U). 
10 Telephone interview with MAJ Michael Csicsila, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), 
Pentagon, 4 March 2004. 
11 Findlay, Special Forces Integration. pp. 22-23. 
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still had forces on the ground in Bosnia that had previously participated in the 
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and would stay to join the NATO-
led IFOR. 
IFOR recognized the need to ensure that an adequate chain of 
communications and coordination existed between the elements.  Special Forces 
responded with the establishment of LCE operations.  Special Forces had 
integrated with foreign military forces under the coalition umbrella in the past.  
During Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, US Army Special Forces deployed 
Coalition Support Elements (CSE) to various foreign units, providing liaisons with 
critical communications packages, the glue which kept the coalition together in 
the desert.   
In Bosnia, the LCE enhanced NATO coordination with foreign military 
units and enabled communication and connectivity in the decision-making 
process.  The language ability, regional orientation and relative maturity, in age, 
rank, and experience, of the Special Forces soldiers led IFOR to select them as 
the ideal vehicle to successfully conduct the LCE mission.  
The 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) received the mission to field the 
first LCEs.  After linking-up with their non-NATO military units, the LCEs fulfilled 
five key tasks for IFOR:  
1.  Provide communications connectivity. 
2.  Provide liaison with C2 (command and control) Architecture. 
3.  Provide liaison with Intell Architecture. 
4. Provide CAS/TGO (Close-Air Support/Terminal Guidance 
Operations) capability. 
5.  Provide Tactical Air Control Capability.12 
The 10th SFG (A) provided an initial force package of 240 personnel in 
December 1995 with three Special Operations Command and Control Elements  
                                            
12 Operation Joint Guard PowerPoint Briefing. December 1995-November 1996.  
10 
(SOCCEs) to direct the efforts of 10 LCEs in theater.13  Each LCE consisted of 
six US Army Special Forces personnel and one US Air Force Special Operations 
Tactical Air Control operator.14   
FM 3-5.20 defines the SOCCE as “A C2 element based on a Special 
Forces company headquarters element augmented with a communications 
package, equipment and selected personnel as required by the mission.”15  
During the initial deployment of SF personnel by the 10th SFG (A), each SOCCE 
controlled three LCEs or approximately 18 personnel in three locations.   
The 10th SFG (A) provided LCEs with the appropriate language 
capability to [a] Hungarian Engineer Battalion, [a] Romanian 
Engineer Battalion (both IFOR assets), [a] Russian Airborne 
Brigade, [a] Turkish Brigade, [a] Polish Airborne Battalion, all 
assets of the Multinational Division-North.  The 10th SFG (A) also 
provided an LCE to the Czech Battle Group of Multinational 
Division-Southwest (MND-SW).  The 1st SFG (A) provided an LCE 
to the Malaysian Battle Group of MND-SW and the 5th SFG (A) 
provided an LCE to the Egyptian Battalion of Multinational Division-
Southeast (MND-SE).16 
Although the LCE missions proved successful in Bosnia, the troop 
contributing nations (TCN) to which the LCEs were assigned quickly adapted to 
the operational situation, acquiring the necessary communications and language 
ability, allowing them functional independence within the NATO command 
structure.  “By November 1996, only the Hungarian Engineer Battalion and the 
Russian Airborne Brigade still had LCEs.”17  
The LCE mission proved itself critical during the first 11 months of 
Operation Joint Endeavor by enabling open communications and minimizing 
                                            
13 Ibid. 
14 Jonathan D. White, Doctrine for Special Forces in Stability and Support Operations, 
School of Advanced Military Studies, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, 
Kansas, Second Term, Academic Year 1999-2000, p. 19. 
15 FM 3-5.20, Doctrine for Special Operations Forces Operations.  Washington, D.C.: GPO, 
2001c, pp. 4-6. 
16 White, Doctrine for Special Forces. p. 20. 
17 Chad Storlie, “The Liaison Coordination Element: Force Multiplier for Coalition 
Operations,” Special Warfare Magazine, Spring 1999, p. 40.  From White. Doctrine for Special 
Forces. p. 20. 
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ambiguity between IFOR NATO and non-NATO TCNs.  Although this mission 
proved low-risk for the Special Forces soldiers involved, the overall semi-
permissive environment in Bosnia at the time, still reeling from the ethnic 
violence, paramilitary activities and displaced civilians, remained higher risk.  
LCEs contributed to IFOR success by training their respective TCN in MEDEVAC 
procedures, call for fire procedures and communications.  
F. JOINT COMMISSION OBSERVER (JCO) OPERATIONS (OPERATION 
JOINT GUARD) 
The British launched the JCO mission during the later phases of UN 
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) operations in Bosnia from 1994-1995.  The 
UNPROFOR Commander at the time, British General Sir Michael Rose, selected 
a group of soldiers to act as his “directed telescopes”, with the mission of 
providing him with a frank, true assessment of the situation on the ground as well 
as serving as forward air controllers to direct air strikes as necessary.18  When 
IFOR moved into Bosnia on 20 December 1995, this JCO system operated 
throughout the country.    
Upon accepting the hand-off of the JCO mission from the British as IFOR 
transitioned to SFOR, approximately 18 US Special Forces teams assumed the 
JCO mission in all three MND sectors, commanded and controlled by Special 
Operations Command and Control Elements (SOCCE) co-located with each 
MND headquarters.19  The mission of the SOCCE was to command, control, and 
communicate with all JCO teams within the given MND sector, support the teams 
as an intelligence conduit, and advise each MND commander on the appropriate 
employment of the SOF assets within his sector.20 
In 1998 the French and British replaced the US Special Forces JCO 
teams in their sectors with their own JCOs.  US JCO operations shifted 
exclusively to the  US-run MND-N sector.21    
                                            
18 Findlay, Special Forces Integration. pp. 21-22. 
19 Cleveland, Command and Control. p. 6. 
20 Findlay, Special Forces Integration. p. 30. 
21 Cleveland, Command and Control. p. 7.   
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The JCO teams dressed in the standard battle dress uniform (BDU) with 
no unit patches, special skill badges or rank.  Only their nametape and US Army 
tape identified them as US soldiers.  Unlike other SFOR soldiers, the JCOs wore 
patrol caps rather than Kevlar helmets, conducted business without body armor 
and carried no rifles.  JCO team members carried only concealed M9 pistols 
beneath their BDUs, hoping to present a less threatening image to the people in 
their sectors and demonstrate a level of confidence by traveling lightly armed.  
The JCOs drove rented civilian sports utility vehicles (SUVs) and rented houses 
to live in on the economy amongst the population while the conventional SFOR 
units lived in heavily fortified cantonment areas.   
The JCO mission continued, as it had under the British, with the key tasks 
of “direct liaison, communications, and information exchange with the FWF 
(former warfighting forces) forces.”22  The Special Forces teams initially 
identified, contacted and maintained open dialogue with key players and power 
brokers in the communities in which they lived and operated.  The JCOs provided 
both the MND and SFOR commanders with several unique capabilities which 
conventional units were not organized or trained to provide.   
First, they offered the conventional force commanders accurate 
assessments of the sentiments of the population through their personal 
interaction with the people within their sector on a daily basis.  Second, the JCOs 
provided a conduit through which the conventional commander could 
immediately gain access to key local personnel in the event of an emergency or 
crisis and speak with them through the secure communications of the JCOs.  
Third, the JCOs served as the commander’s eyes and ears within the sector, 
providing ground truth and accurate reporting on critical events.23  Overall, the 
JCO was about relationship building. 
 
                                             
22 Findlay, Special Forces Integration. p. 24. 
23 Telephone Interview with MAJ Jonathan Cash, US Army Student Detachment, 5 March 
2004. 
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G. JCO BIJELJINA (OPERATION JOINT FORGE) 
Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha (SFODA) 086, 
commanded by Special Forces CPT Jonathan Cash in the city of Bijeljina within 
the MND-N sector, divided the detachment into four elements to accomplish its 
mission, each focusing upon a “functional area.”   
• Political Team-Maintaining communications with the Mayor, 
members of parliament, political party leaders and international or 
regional organizations such as the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe. 
• Military Team-Building rapport and getting to know the military 
leaders within the sector, the locations of all units and checkpoints 
and their strengths, weaknesses and concerns. 
• Judicial and Police Team-Working with the local and national 
police, members of the judicial system and courts within the sector. 
• Floating Team-Available to reinforce any other team requiring 
assistance or to deal with particular areas of concern.24   
By assigning two detachment members to each functional area, the 
detachment effectively built rapport and enabled communication with most key 
leaders among various walks of life throughout their sector.  The teams fostered 
these habitual working relationships not only with the key leaders but with 
members of the population at large.  This allowed the detachments to accurately 
read the sentiment of the population and notify their higher headquarters of 
impending problems or unrest before they occurred. 
Although the detachments received intelligence and taskings from their 
SOCCE co-located with MND-N, the JCOs carefully avoided being perceived as 
acting as intelligence gatherers among the local people with whom they 
interacted.  In order to gain the trust of the people within their sectors, the JCOs 
relied upon their credibility, which included, to a large degree, trust.  Another 
potential pitfall for JCOs was favoritism of one FWF over another.  JCO teams 
policed themselves to ensure that team members did not  become overly 
sympathetic to one ethnic group over another.  Some JCO teams divided their  
                                            
24 Ibid., 5 March 2004. 
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detachments into “Serb teams” which would only work with and report on Serbian 
villages and “Bosniak teams” exclusively focusing their efforts upon Bosnian 
Muslim villages.25  
H. FROM JCO TO SR (OPERATION ALLIED FORCE) 
The training and flexibility of Special Forces teams operating in JCO roles 
allowed them to quickly shift their mission if necessary.  CPT Cash’s ODA 086 
demonstrated this flexibility while serving as a JCO in Bijeljina during Operation 
Allied Force.  During the first week of April 1999, MND-N received word that the 
Russian military unit, the 13th Tactical Group, working within the MND-N sector 
had begun moving vehicles and personnel out of their base camp in Uglevik, 
Republika Srpska (RS), to staging areas in Bijeljina.  Fearing that the Russians 
were pre-positioning vehicles and personnel to move into Kosovo, NATO 
required information on the 13th Tactical Group.  The MND-N CDR turned to the 
SOCCE commander to fulfill this intelligence requirement.  The SOCCE ordered 
SFODA 786 to conduct special reconnaissance (SR) to report on the activities of 
the 13th Tactical Group.   
CPT Cash’s 10-man detachment, augmented by four Navy SEALs from 
the CJSOTF in Sarajevo, task organized into several reconnaissance elements 
to conduct SR on the staging area in Bijeljina and the nearest crossing point from 
Bosnia into Serbia along the Drina River.  Using video imagery, SFODA 086 
recorded the Russians repainting their vehicles from the distinctive IFOR letters 
to KFOR in Bijeljina.  On 11 June 1999, the Russians departed their staging area 
and crossed the Drina River into Serbia with a convoy of less than 200 
personnel.  The movement, captured on video, was sent by the SFODA via 
satellite communications to higher headquarters, providing proof to the MND-N 
CDR, COMSFOR, SACEUR and the Pentagon that the Russians were on the 
move.26   
This SFODA provided key information to NATO and US military and 
political decision-makers, confirming suspicions of a unilateral Russian entry into 
                                            
25 Csicsila phone interview, 04 March 2004. 
26 Cash phone interview, 5 March 2004. 
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Kosovo to seize the Pristina Airfield.  The intelligence gathered and the rapid 
flexibility demonstrated by the Special Forces soldiers, transitioning from JCO to 
SR in support of the MND commander’s requirements, undoubtedly contributed 
to the conventional commander’s willingness to employ US Special Forces in 
higher risk missions as the mission shifted to Kosovo.   
I. SPECIAL FORCES IN ALBANIA (OPERATION ALLIED FORCE) 
MAJ Roger Carstens, commander of Company A, 1st Battalion, 10th 
Special Forces Group (Airborne), received the mission to deploy a small Special 
Forces element to Albania in support of the US Task Force Hawk, commanded 
by LTG Jay Hendrix.  LTG Hendrix informed Carstens that he did not yet have a 
mission for the Special Forces soldiers, but former MND-N Commander GEN 
Montgomery Meigs had advised him, “I take Special Forces wherever I go.  Even 
if I don’t have a mission for them, they’ll find a mission and they always add great 
value.”27  Once in Albania, LTG Hendrix tasked Carstens to report on the size, 
disposition and location of Serb military forces in Kosovo without allowing the 
deployment of US Special Forces personnel over the Albanian border into 
Kosovo.  Carstens deployed four Special Forces elements forward to within five 
miles of the northern Albanian border where the US personnel contacted the 
KLA, referred to in Albanian as the UCK (Ushtria Clirimtare Kosova).28 
After offering support to the UCK, the Special Forces personnel, using US 
college students studying abroad in Albania as interpreters, conducted daily visits 
to the guerrilla basecamps within Albania where they co-located with the UCK 
communications sections.  As the UCK guerrillas fighting in Kosovo acquired 
targets, such as Serb tanks, armored vehicles or large troop formations, they 
radioed the target locations back to the basecamps where the UCK command 
quickly passed the information to US Special Forces personnel.  The US soldiers 
transmitted the targeting information to the Special Forces command element, 
co-located with TF Hawk, which passed the information to the Combined Air 
                                            
27 Telephone Interview with MAJ Roger Carstens, Commander, CO F, 1st Battalion, 1st 
Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne), Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 25 February 2004. 
28 Ibid., 25 February 2004.  
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Operations Center (CAOC) in Italy.  The CAOC then tasked close-air support 
missions to NATO aircraft, which attacked the targets accordingly.   
Following the engagements, the UCK guerillas on the ground observing 
the effects of the close air support reported the battle damage assessment, 
which the Special Forces soldiers relayed back to TF Hawk.  Carstens estimated 
that the combined US/UCK targeting effort engaged over 1,000 targets during  
Operation Allied Force, including the destruction of 75 armored vehicles and the 
annihilation of a Serb infantry battalion on Mount Pastrick in Kosovo with a B-52 
strike.29 
Although the Special Forces soldiers were prohibited from entering 
Kosovo with the UCK guerrillas to engage in ground combat and therefore did 
not conduct unconventional warfare (UW) in the classic sense, the mission 
demonstrated a willingness of conventional commanders to assume greater risks 
with Special Forces personnel than they had previously in Bosnia.  Maximizing 
their effectiveness as force multipliers, the 20-plus Special Forces soldiers 
increased the effectiveness of NATO airpower through the use of surrogate 
forces on the ground in an area restricted to US forces.  The UCK also learned to 
trust the Special Forces soldiers who delivered what they had promised in the 
form of air support to ground operations.  Although LTG Hendrix did not have a 
specific mission for Special Forces, he wanted them as part of his arsenal in 
Albania, solely based upon counsel from a former MND-N commander.  True to 
Gen Meig’s advice, the Special Force soldiers found a mission and made a great 
contribution to TF Hawk.  The end of Operation Allied Force opened a new 
chapter in the Special Forces Balkans saga: operations in Kosovo. 
J. OPERATION JOINT GUARDIAN-SPECIAL FORCES IN KOSOVO 
US Special Forces LCEs operated in Kosovo following Operation Allied 
Force, providing liaisons to a United Arab Emirates Special Forces unit, a Greek 
mechanized battalion, a Polish Air Assault battalion and the Russian 13th Task 
                                            
29 Ibid.  
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Group.30  The LCEs maintained the same mission profile in Kosovo as they had 
in Bosnia but provided a broader capability, to include unilateral and combined 
missions at both the tactical and operational levels.31  The JCO mission changed  
names in Kosovo and became known as the Liaison Team (LT) mission.  With or 
without name changes, the Special Forces missions had evolved since the LCE 
and JCO missions of Operations Joint Endeavor and Joint Guard. 
The following discussion considers the operations conducted by two 
Special Forces teams, one operating as an LCE and the other as an LT.  An 
analysis of these missions demonstrates the increased level of risk that 
commanders accepted in employment of Special Forces assets in Kosovo as 
compared to operations in Bosnia, due to the increased confidence in their SOF 
since December 1995.  
K. SPECIAL FORCES LCE WITH RUSSIAN 13TH TASK GROUP 
(OPERATION JOINT GUARDIAN) 
Following the movement of the Russian 13th Task Group (13th TG) from 
Bijeljina, RS, the Russians eventually moved a force of 3600 soldiers into 
Kosovo.  The 13th TG received a Special Forces LCE at their headquarters in 
Kamenica, approximately 100km southwest of Pristina on the Serbian border.  
The 13th Task Group operated within the US Multinational Brigade-East (MNB-E) 
Sector commanded by BG Ricardo Sanchez.32  Following the Russian 
movement to the Pristina Airfield in Kosovo, tensions had increased between the 
Russians and NATO, particularly the United States.  Commanding the two-plus 
battalions of Russian soldiers was a 29-year old Russian Colonel who had led 
the unit during the second battle of Grozny in Chechnya.33 
                                            
30 Bruce R. Swatek, Role of Special Forces Liaison Elements in Future Multinational 
Operations, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2002, p. 
46. 
31 Ibid., p. 46.   
32 LTG Sanchez currently serves as the Commanding General of V Corps United States 
Army Europe and Seventh Army with duty as Commanding General Joint Task Force-7, Iraq. 
33 Csicsila phone interview, 4 March 2004. 
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The 13th TG had very few supplies and suffered logistically.  The LCE 
built rapport with the 13th TG, assisting in the construction of their base camps, 
checkpoints, and barricades and improving their force protection posture with 
building projects.  The LCE also provided the 13th TG with necessities 
unavailable through the Russian supply system such as oil, transmission fluid, 
fuel and fruit.  CPT Michael Csicsila, commander of SFODA 095 and LCE Team  
Leader, served as the direct US counterpart of the Russian COL commanding 
the 13th TG, interacting with him on a daily basis.  Simultaneously, the Special 
Forces NCOs on the LCE functioned as the direct counterparts of the Russian 
company commanders.   
BG Sanchez utilized his Russian LCE in a more aggressive role than the 
LCEs in Bosnia, telling the SFODA what he wanted the Russians to do rather 
than commanding the Russians to execute tasks within the sector.  The LCE 
would then persuade the Russians to accomplish the objectives of the MNB-E 
commander, reducing the possibility of ill-will between the two countries.  
On 16 December 1999, two members of the Special Forces LCE traveling 
in a vehicle struck a landmine in the vicinity of Kamenica.  Upon notification that 
LCE members were injured, the commander of Task Group 13 immediately 
dispatched Russian troops and trucks to the crisis site.  Russian soldiers probed 
their way through a minefield, marking a dozen mines prior to reaching the 
overturned vehicle and the injured soldier inside.  Unfortunately, the US soldier 
died.34   
On 30 December 1999, two Russian soldiers were injured by a landmine 
planted at a platoon checkpoint outside of Kamenica.  Determined to find the 
parties responsible for the mining, the US LCE redoubled its efforts with the 
Albanian Kosovars in the area to identify the suspects while the Russians worked 
with the Serb villages.  Responding to sniper fire against Russian checkpoints 
manned by TG 13 personnel, the LCE requested and received a battery of US 
                                            
34 Ibid., 4 March 2004. The second soldier had crawled out of the vehicle and made his way 
to a Russian checkpoint, commandeering an Albanian vehicle and returning to the Russian 
compound for help.   
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155mm artillery in direct support of their operations.  After a Russian checkpoint 
took sniper fire on 4 January 2000, the LCE called for illumination rounds to 
assist in flushing out the sniper.35  This was the first time since World War II that 
US artillery had fired in support of Russian troops.  Based upon intelligence 
gathered on suspected minelayers, the LCE and Task Group 13 accompanied 
two US infantry battalions in a raid on the town of Koprivica, arresting five men 
and confiscating many weapons.  This also was the first time a combined US-
Russian raid had occurred since World War II.36   
The experience of SFODA 095 in their LCE role with the Russian 13th TG 
demonstrates the evolution of Special Forces operations from Bosnia to Kosovo.  
The LCE with the Russian Airborne Brigade in Uglevik, RS, never conducted 
combined operations with their counterparts as part of IFOR or SFOR.  The 
MNB-E commander, BG Sanchez, used the LCE more aggressively than the 
LCEs in Bosnia, to communicate his intent to the Russian 13th TG in his sector 
and allowed the SFODA the flexibility to support the Russians with artillery and 
conventional forces to conduct a raid. 
L. SPECIAL FORCES LIAISON TEAM (LT) OPERATIONS AND 
GUERRILLA DEMOBILIZATION (OPERATION JOINT GUARDIAN) 
One of the most interesting operations conducted by a Special Forces 
Liaison Team (LT) in Kosovo was undertaken by SFODA 086, commanded by 
CPT Jonathan Cash.  SFODA 086 worked the Gnjilane area of operations (AO) 
in the MNB-E sector, close to the Serbian and Macedonian borders from March 
to August 2001.  The SFODA split into four teams with two team members living 
in each LT house in different towns throughout the several hundred square mile 
sized AO along the tri-border area.  Three of the teams focused on Albanian 
Kosovars (Albanian Tms) while the remaining team focused on Serbs (Serb 
Tm).37  
                                            
35 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Kosovo Force (KFOR) Homepage, “Illumination 
Rounds Light Up the Eastern Boundary Sky” (4 January 2000).  Available [Online] 
<http://www.nato.int/kfor/chronicle/2000/nu_000104.htm> [4 March 2004].   
36 Csicsila phone interview, 4 March 2004. 
37 Cash phone interview, 5 March 2004.   
20 
The Ground Safety Zone (GSZ) existed between the border of Kosovo 
and Serbia.  A 5-10 km wide buffer starting at the Serbian-Kosovo border and 
extending into Serbia, the GSZ was off-limits to Serb military, but patrolled by 
Serbian police.  Many ethnic Albanian villages existed within the GSZ and 
paramilitary activity increased during the summer of 2001.   
UNSCR 1244 specified the key task of demobilizing the KLA (Ushtria 
Clirimtare Kosova or UCK in Albanian) following Operation Allied Force.38  Upon 
their demobilization, some former UCK members went to the GSZ to support 
their ethnic Albanian kin and founded the UCPMB (Ushtria Clirimtare Presheve 
Medveja e Bujanovec) or Liberation Army of Presheva, Medvegja and Bujanoc.  
Presheva, Medvegja and Bujanoc were three ethnic Albanian towns within the 
GSZ in Serbia.  The UCPMB was organized into factions, which might consist of 
100 or so fighters.  
Following several incidents during which the UCPMB shot Serbs in the 
GSZ, the Serbian military pushed to enter the zone and engage the guerrillas.  In 
an effort to defuse an escalating situation, SFODA 086 received the mission to 
solve the problem.  The LT conducted detailed intelligence preparation of the 
battlefield to determine how the UCPMB received weapons, supplies and recruits 
in their sector.   
In June, representatives from the Serb government, US Department of 
State and MNB-E developed a plan to compress the GSZ back towards Kosovo, 
forming a single Kosovo-Serbia border.  The UCPMB activity complicated the 
process and tensions escalated.   
Reacting to increased pressure by the Serbs, KFOR and the 
Macedonians, the commander of the Sefer faction of the UCPMB initiated 
contact through intermediaries with the Special Forces LT due to their credibility 
with the local ethnic Albanian communities.  CPT Cash met with the commander 
                                            
38 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Kosovo Force (KFOR) Homepage, “Resolution 
1244 (1999), Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting, on 10 June 1999” (Date 
Unavailable).  Available [Online] <http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/documents/unscr1244.htm> [4 
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and deputy commanders of the Sefer faction one evening in an Albanian Kosovar 
farmhouse near the GSZ.  CPT Cash and several of his NCOs negotiated the 
surrender and demobiliziation of the Sefer faction for the next day, guaranteeing 
the safety and respectful treatment of the guerrillas on the condition that they 
surrender all of their weapons and ammunition.39   
Cash coordinated with conventional units for vehicle support, security and 
the establishment of a processing station.  Ramadani, the Sefer faction leader, 
arrived the next day at the demobilization point with approximately 40 faction 
members, including one female, and wheelbarrows full of weapons and 
ammunition.  The LCE searched, disarmed, and re-searched the faction 
members for paraphernalia before boarding them on trucks bound for a 
makeshift processing station manned by US military intelligence personnel at a 
nearby 82d Airborne Division basecamp.  The former Sefer faction members 
were photographed, interviewed for basic information, and required to give an 
address of their next destination.  That evening, all the faction members were 
released to go home.40 
The Special Forces LT smoothly transitioned from liaison duties one day 
to the demobilization of a guerrilla force the next.  Demonstrating their value as 
force multipliers, three LT soldiers relied upon their interpersonal skills and 
credibility within the local community, rather than deterrence and firepower, to 
ensure the safety of the Sefer faction members and convince them to demobilize 
without incident.  The MNB-E commander allowed an Army CPT and his NCOs 
to orchestrate the demobilization based upon their Special Forces training in 
UW.41  The evolution of US Army Special Forces in the Balkans had come full 
circle.   
 
                                            
39 Cash phone interview, 5 March 2004. 
40 Ibid., 5 March 2004. 
41 A US-sponsored insurgency consists of seven doctrinal phases, of which the final phase is 
demobilization of the guerrilla force.  US Army Special Forces is the only unit in the US military 
trained specifically in guerrilla force demobilization.   
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M. CONCLUSION 
From their initial entry into Bosnia conducting LCE missions with TCN to 
guerrilla demobilization as liaison teams in Kosovo, US Army Special Forces 
came of age in the Balkans from 1995 to 2001.  Special Forces overcame the 
initial suspicion with which they were viewed by conventional commanders, 
discussed at greater length in the following chapter, delivering results and 
gaining the confidence of US leaders.  In turn, the conventional decision-makers 
assumed greater risks in the employment of their Special Forces assets over the 
years in the Balkans, granting them greater flexibility and responsibility.  The 
Balkans experience ultimately prepared Special Forces for their successes in 
Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom during the Global War on 
Terror.  
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III. BALKANS LESSONS LEARNED 
This chapter considers the lessons learned by Special Forces in the 
Balkans from 1995-2001. This first section analyzes the lessons learned 
beginning with the IFOR entry in Bosnia from 1995 to 1996 in Operation Joint 
Endeavor and the initial Special Forces mission.  The second section discusses 
the challenges faced by Special Forces after the transition from Implementation 
Force (IFOR) to Stabilization Force (SFOR) in December 1996 in Operation Joint 
Guard and into the 1998 transition to Operation Joint Forge.  Finally, this study 
analyzes lessons learned during Operation Allied Force in the spring of 1999 in 
Albania and the subsequent Operation Joint Guardian in Kosovo.  The 
conclusion of this chapter suggests that as Special Forces and conventional 
commanders worked together over the years, these commanders gradually felt 
more comfortable with their US Army Special Operations Forces (SOF) and 
assumed greater risks in their employment.   
SOF may provide support to conventional commanders.  NATO 
operations in the Balkans forced SOF and conventional forces to work together 
for a longer period of time and to a greater degree than ever before.  In time, 
both SOF and the conventional forces overcame their traditional distrust for one 
another, borne partly of unfamiliarity, to achieve the goal of mission success.  
Despite the numerous volumes available discussing NATO operations in the 
Balkans, little open-source material on the role of US Army Special Forces during 
this period exists.  Theses and personal interviews provide the majority of 
research information for the discussion that follows. 
The identification of lessons learned by the Special Forces soldiers during 
operations in the Balkans proves critical to the later analysis of institutionalization 
of the lessons learned into Special Forces training and their ultimate application 




A. OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR LESSONS LEARNED 
What were the lessons learned by Special Forces during Operation Joint 
Endeavor?  The first lesson was that leaders failed to utilize Special Forces to 
their full capabilities in the uncertain environment of Bosnia for the first year 
following the arrival of IFOR.  By limiting Special Forces to solely conducting 
Liaison Coordination Element (LCE) operations, US commanders missed the 
opportunity to employ a tremendous intelligence-gathering asset that may have 
aided in clearing the murky intelligence picture.  Although Special Forces 
operated in all Multinational Division (MND) sectors as LCEs during Joint 
Endeavor, MND commanders chose not to use them for any other purpose.  “US 
Special Forces support of US commanders in this first year-the critical year-was 
limited unfortunately to that of providing liaison teams (the LCEs), a function 
rapidly taken over by the MND’s organic liaison teams.”42 
The second lesson learned was that Special Forces and conventional 
forces needed to work better together.  Although US Special Forces trained in 
supporting conventional units at the National Training Center (NTC) and Joint 
Readiness Training Center (JRTC), the two elements worked together only 
briefly, normally for a week or two, with a liaison team called a Special 
Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE) as the focal point for 
coordination.43  As a result, mutual distrust existed between the Special Forces 
personnel and the conventional units.  This distrust lessened the emphasis that 
conventional commanders placed upon the use of their Special Forces assets 
and subsequently, on the attitudes of subordinate conventional commanders 
operating within the MND sector.  LTC Michael Findlay sums up this situation:  
 
                                            
42 Michael L. Findlay, Special Forces Integration with Multinational Division-North in Bosnia 
Herzegovina, A Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command 
and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 21 May 1998, p. 37.  
43 A SOCCE, normally a 12-man Special Forces company headquarters, deploys to the 
supported conventional unit headquarters where it provides C3I for its deployed Special Forces 
Operational Detachment-Alphas (SFODAs), coordinates and deconflicts issues with the 
supported conventional force and advises the conventional commander on the proper 
employment of his Special Forces assets.   
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Many US conventional commanders and staff lacked trust in USSF 
[Special Forces] because they felt the Special Forces were not 
focused on ensuring MND-N success.  They believed USSF 
[Special Forces] were not part of the ‘team’ because of the weak 
command relationships with MND-N addressed earlier, their not 
being ‘productive’ members of the TF Eagle team, and the belief 
that they were avoiding hardships facing conventional troops.  This 
lack of trust reduced open communications and resulted in both 
elements not receiving the benefits of each other’s thoughts when 
making decisions.44   
MND commanders proved reluctant in employing Special Forces and risk-
averse when they chose to utilize them.  Special Forces C2 elements, such as 
the SOCCE, failed to integrate themselves into the conventional command 
structure for planning purposes where they could influence the conventional 
decision cycle.  To their credit, Special Forces soon identified these deficiencies 
and addressed them during Operations Joint Guard and Joint Forge.  
B. OPERATIONS JOINT GUARD AND JOINT FORGE LESSONS 
LEARNED 
As discussed in the previous chapter, when IFOR transitioned to SFOR on 
20 December 1996 and Operation Joint Endeavor became Operation Joint 
Guard, the special operations command relationship changed significantly in 
Bosnia, with the United States assuming command of the Combined Joint 
Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) from the British.45  With the 
assumption of the mission by SFOR, US Special Forces maintained only three 
LCEs, working with the Russians, Hungarians and Romanians.46    
Along with the transition of command, the United States assumed the 
Joint Commission Observer (JCO) program from the British as well.  The JCO 
program consisted of Special Forces soldiers living among and interacting with 
the local communities within each MND sector in order to provide the 
                                            
44 Findlay, Special Forces Integration. p. 49. 
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US Army Special Forces in Bosnia, Strategy Research Project, US Army War College, Carlisle 
Barracks, Pennsylvania, USAWC Class of 2001, p. 6. 
46 Operation Joint Guard PowerPoint Briefing, Headquarters, 10th Special Forces Group 
(Airborne), Concept of Operations: Operation Joint Guard, date unknown, provided by Command 
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conventional commanders with ground truth information and a clear reading of 
public sentiment.47  The JCOs also maintained contact with the influential 
members of the Former Warfighting Factions (FWF) and key local leaders, 
providing rapid access and communications to these individuals for IFOR 
commanders in order to defuse potentially dangerous situations.   
The first lesson learned during Operation Joint Guard became evident 
following the assumption of the JCO mission by the United States from the 
British.  The US soldiers received no training and minimal handover from their 
UK colleagues.  As a result, the effectiveness of the JCO mission suffered during 
the first year of Operation Joint Guard as the JCOs learned by trial and error 
while seasoning themselves in the role.   
The lack of a cohesive program at the time of the transfer of the 
mission [from the British to the US] and the lack of documentation 
of British JCO staff procedures meant the US would have to 
develop its own processes.  For nearly a year the program relied 
heavily on the energy and abilities of the individual [US Special 
Forces] teams to accomplish the mission, while the headquarters 
wrestled with the challenges of this long term special operation.48  
LTC Charlie Cleveland, battalion commander of 3rd Battalion, 10th 
Special Forces Group (Airborne), identified this and several other weaknesses in 
the JCO program.  Along with the poor handover and lack of training, Cleveland 
noted a lack of direction for the JCOs by their higher headquarters and perceived 
a disconnect between JCO mission planning and effective support of the 
conventional commander’s intelligence requirements.  Cleveland developed and 
fielded a new “JCO methodology,” standardizing JCO tactics, techniques and 
procedures (TTP).  Cleveland additionally implemented a JCO targeting process 
to identify power players within local, regional and national formal and informal 
hierarchies and incorporated the SFOR and MND commander’s intelligence 
requirements into the JCO collection plan.49  The effectiveness of the US JCOs 
increased during Operation Joint Forge in 1998, following the implementation of 
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49 Ibid., pp. 8-15.  
27 
Cleveland’s methodology.  Special Forces successfully integrated itself more into 
the conventional planning process and JCOs focused upon answering the SFOR 
and MND commander’s intelligence requirements, proving themselves a valuable 
resource.  Within a year, the Special Forces role in the Balkans would widen as 
NATO fought to end Serb aggression in Kosovo during Operation Allied Force. 
C. OPERATION ALLIED FORCE LESSONS LEARNED 
Although the Special Forces soldiers proved themselves as effective force 
multipliers during operations in Kosovo, through the effective support they 
provided to the UCK guerrillas, several major lessons learned subsequently 
emerged from the Special Forces experience during Operation Allied Force.  
First, although US military aircraft regularly attacked Serb targets within Kosovo, 
the decision forbidding the Special Forces soldiers from accompanying the UCK 
guerrillas into Kosovo to conduct combat operations very likely limited the 
effectiveness of their resistance operations against the Serb military.  Secondly, 
the circuitous close-air support (CAS) procedures required for political reasons, 
degraded the effectiveness of NATO airstrikes in the targeting process against 
the Serbs.   
Special Forces personnel might have increased the effectiveness of the 
UCK, had the Americans accompanied them on combat operations.  Specifically 
trained to organize, train, advise and assist guerrilla forces fighting against 
technologically and numerically superior forces, the integration of Special Forces 
personnel into the UCK hierarchy as advisors could have likely improved the 
offensive and intelligence gathering roles of the guerrillas.   
NATO coalition intelligence might have benefitted from the presence of US 
Special Forces personnel on the ground.  Key leaders and planners from the 
SACEUR level down could have received additional intelligence from US 
personnel on the ground, expediting the targeting process.  NATO priority 
intelligence requirements (PIR) and information requirements (IR) could have 
been tasked down to the soldiers operating with the guerrillas in order to fill this 
critical human intelligence (HUMINT) capability gap.  Special Forces personnel 
on the ground may have provided an additional measure of safety for civilians on 
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the battlefield as well.  As part of the agreement with the UCK to provide CAS, no 
civilians were to be located within two kilometers of targets radioed back to the 
Special Forces personnel at the UCK basecamps.  Special Forces troops on the 
ground could have verified this safety measure, possibly decreasing the number 
of civilian casualties due to NATO airstrikes  
The second lesson learned is that the Special Forces soldiers should have 
been allowed to communicate directly with the close air support platforms 
engaging targets during operations in Kosovo.  Again, the decision prohibiting the 
direct communication between the Special Forces personnel and the aircraft was 
a conscious political decision designed to distance the direct participation of US 
personnel in the targeting process based upon UCK intelligence in Kosovo.  The 
lengthy targeting process which required the UCK to radio targets to their 
basecamp where the Special Forces soldiers would then relay the information 
back to Task Force Hawk, to the CAOC in Italy and finally to the aircraft took 
between 2 to 4 hours.  Although this would not affect stationary targets, mobile 
targets, such as Serb artillery proved difficult to engage successfully.  UCK 
elements engaged in direct combat with Serb units could have received 
emergency close-air support, reducing their casualties through rapid engagement 
of Serb forces.  Critical UCK supply routes between Albania and guerrilla units 
engaged in combat could have been better protected from ground interdiction 
through immediate close air support as well.   
D. OPERATION JOINT GUARDIAN LESSONS LEARNED 
Special Forces learned an important lesson during LCE operations in 
Bosnia that it applied in Kosovo.  The LCE could function as more than just a 
mouthpiece for conventional commanders.  When provided with a clear 
understanding of the commander’s guidance and intent, the LCEs could 
effectively influence the decision-making process of the TCN unit commanders.  
This was dependent upon aggressive use of the LCEs by the conventional 
commander.   
The second lesson learned was that conventional commanders increased 
the amount of risk they would allow their Special Forces personnel to take within 
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their sectors.  BG Sanchez allowed Special Forces to call for fire in support of the 
Russian 13th TG and participate in a combined raid.  MND commanders in 
Bosnia would not have assumed this level of risk in the use of Special Forces.  
This increase in the acceptability of risk is attributable to several factors.  
Conventional commanders had developed a measure of trust in their Special 
Forces after five years of operations in the Balkans.  These commanders better 
understood the capabilities and weaknesses of their assets and felt more 
comfortable in their employment.  Special Forces had also effectively integrated 
themselves into the conventional forces command structure and fully participated 
as members of staffs. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The Special Forces experience in the Balkans from 1995 to 2001 
produced several lessons learned.  The majority of these lessons revealed 
weaknesses in Special Forces doctrine, specifically with respect to its integration 
and support for conventional forces.  However, Special Forces had matured from 
Bosnia to Kosovo.  Having demonstrated their utility during operations with the 
UCK during Operation Allied Force in Albania, Special Forces took a step 
forward in demonstrating their utility to conventional commanders.  In Kosovo, as 
opposed to Bosnia, conventional commanders wanted Special Forces personnel 
working in their areas due to the intelligence these soldiers provided and the 
access they maintained with the indigenous population. 
Some constraints placed upon Special Forces during Operation Allied 
Force, such as the inability of US personnel to accompany UCK guerrillas on 
operations into Kosovo and the unwieldy CAS request system quickly re-
emerged as important considerations following the terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001 as the United States launched Special Forces into Afghanistan during 
the opening days of Operation Enduring Freedom.  The following chapter will 
describe Special Forces operations in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring 
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IV. OPERATIONS ENDURING FREEDOM AND IRAQI FREEDOM 
Within about two months of the start of combat operations, several 
hundred CIA operatives and Special Forces soldiers, backed by the 
striking power of US aircraft and a much larger infrastructure of 
intelligence and support efforts had combined with Afghan militias 
and a small number of other coalition soldiers to destroy the 
Taliban regime and disrupt al-Qaeda.  They had killed or captured 
about a quarter of the enemy’s known leaders.50 
This chapter examines the role of Special Forces in Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), answering the research 
question: What types of operations did Special Forces conduct in OEF and OIF.  
Investigation of Special Forces employment in OEF and OIF will assist the 
overall analysis of the chronological evolution of Special Forces operations from 
the mid-1990s to present day.    
A. OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM 
1. Setting the Stage 
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, as the US Central 
Command (CENTCOM) staff analyzed the feasibility of attacking Afghanistan, 
they recognized two critical shortcomings.  No plan existed to fight a conventional 
war in Afghanistan, nor did the US maintain basing arrangements with any 
neighboring countries from which ground forces could rapidly enter 
Afghanistan.51  Faced with the mission of annihilating the al-Qaeda terrorist 
group and removing the ruling Taliban regime from power, Afghanistan posed 
unique challenges to military planners.  Geographically constrained by the land-
locked, mountainous topography, US forces would either have to fly or move 
overland into Afghanistan.  Complicating matters further, no modern 
infrastructure existed within the country, conditions being primitive.  Roads,  
                                            
50 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the United States, W.W. Norton and Company (New York: 2004), p. 337. 
51 Tommy R. Franks, American Soldier, Regan Books (New York: 2004), p. 251. 
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airfields and scarce public services were still largely in a state of disrepair from 
the Soviet occupation of the 1980s, presenting a logistical nightmare to planners 
considering large scale conventional troop movements.   
CENTCOM knew that the Taliban, the Islamic fundamentalist group 
controlling 70 to 80 percent of Afghanistan, supported al-Qaeda operations and 
provided a safe haven to their leaders, including Osama bin-Laden.  The loosely 
organized Taliban militia, comprised primarily of ethnic Pashtuns, largely ad-hoc 
and unorganized in terms of a modern-day military, would very likely move to the 
mountains once challenged, resulting in an anticipated light infantry fight.    
The US had maintained some contact with the group of predominantly 
ethnic Tajik tribal warlords opposing the rule of the Taliban from the northern 
section of Afghanistan, known as the Northern Alliance.  Al-Qaeda assassinated 
the de-facto leader of the Northern Alliance, General Ahmad Shah Massoud, on 
10 September 2001, in an attempt to destabilize the Northern Alliance in 
preparation for an anticipated military response from the US following the attacks 
of September 11.52  Without Massoud, al-Qaeda believed the warlords of the 
Northern Alliance would each attempt to gain power, negating their ability to work 
together against the Taliban or in concert with US forces in the event of an 
American invasion of Afghanistan.  
After considering the available options General Franks and Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld chose to forego a large, conventional deployment to 
Afghanistan: 
Secretary Rumsfeld and I agreed that the US force should remain 
small.  We wanted to avoid cumbersome Soviet-style occupation by 
armored divisions.  It hadn’t worked for the Soviets and it wouldn’t 
work for us.  Flexibility and rapid reaction-airborne and helicopter-
borne night assault by small, lethal, and unpredictable units 
coupled with unprecedented precision-would be the hallmarks of 
America’s first war in the twenty-first century.53   
                                            
52 Ibid., p. 240. 
53 Ibid., p. 271. 
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With these considerations in mind, CENTCOM chose to employ US Army 
Special Forces as the initial ground combat force in Afghanistan.  Personnel from 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) established initial contact with various 
Northern Alliance warlords, offering money and support, laying the groundwork 
for cooperation with US Special Forces soldiers.54  The coalition air campaign 
would target the Taliban command and control infrastructure and leadership to 
blind the regime, while Special Forces infiltrated Afghanistan and linked-up with 
the Northern Alliance warlords.  The Special Forces personnel would organize 
and assist the Northern Alliance to destroy al-Qaeda and unseat the Taliban, at 
which point conventional forces would arrive in Afghanistan to mop up the 
remains.55   
General Franks estimated the overthrow of the Taliban and the destruction 
of al-Qaeda could be achieved by 200 Special Forces soldiers working with the 
Northern Alliance and supported by coalition close air support (CAS).56  Special 
Forces commenced combat operations in Afghanistan on 15 October 2001.57 
2. Command and Control 
CENTCOM established three Combined/Joint Special Operations Task 
Forces (C/JSOTFs) to conduct operations in Afghanistan, two of which included 
US Army Special Forces personnel.  C/JSOTF-North, codenamed Task Force 
Dagger formed around the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) to conduct initial 
operations against al-Qaeda and the Taliban.58  Combined/Joint Special 
Operations Task Force-South (C/JSOTF-South), codenamed Task Force K-Bar, 
originally consisted of a US Navy SEAL element and the special operations 
                                            
54 A US-sponsored insurgency consists of seven doctrinal phases.  The second phase 
typically involves agencies other than DoD making contact with potential resistance organizations 
to prepare them for the arrival of Special Forces soldiers.  These soldiers then organize, train, 
advise and assist the resistance organization as necessary to overthrow the existing government.   
55 Franks, American Soldier, p. 271.   
56 Ibid., p. 271. 
57 Gregory Fontenot, E. J. Degen and David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group, Office of the Chief of Staff US 
Army, Combat Studies Institute Press (Fort Leavenworth, 2004), p. 24. 
58 “PBS Frontline: Campaign Against Terror: Interview: Colonel John Mulholland”, PBS, p. 1.  
Available [Online]: <http: 
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/interviews/mulholland.html> [28 July 2004]. 
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forces (SOF) of other coalition nations, arriving in Afghanistan in late November 
2001 and augmented in December by one company from the 1st Battalion, 5th 
SFG (A).59  The final C/JSOTF, codenamed Task Force Sword, conducted 
operations beyond the scope of this unclassified thesis.  This study will primarily 
analyze the operations conducted by Task Force Dagger. 
Commanded by COL John Mulholland, commander of the 5th SFG (A), 
Task Force Dagger directed the efforts of Army, Navy and Air Force special 
operations forces to conduct unconventional warfare operations.  Task Force 
Dagger initially based out of Karshi-Khanabad (K2) Airfield in Uzbekistan, located 
90 miles from the Afghan border before relocating to Afghanistan.  Deviating from 
SOF doctrine, Mulholland initially reported directly to CENTCOM Commander 
General Franks rather than through Special Operations Command-Central 
(SOCCENT).60  This command relationship aligned itself with doctrine in 
December when SOCCENT established C/JSOTF-Afghanistan (C/JSOTF-AF), 
the Coalition Joint Forces Special Operations Component Command 
(CJFSOCC).61  Beginning in December 2001, Task Force Dagger reported 
through C/JSOTF-AF to the CENTCOM commander.  This command relationship 
remained in place until COL Mulholland disestablished Task Force Dagger on 15 
March 2002 as the active duty 3rd Special Forces Group and Army Reserve 19th 
Special Forces Group assumed the Afghanistan mission.62  
3. Scheme of Maneuver 
Task Force Dagger initiated operations on the evening of 19-20 October 
2001, infiltrating two SFODAs to conduct unconventional warfare in support of 
the Northern Alliance.  Coalition planners hoped to gain a foothold in northern 
Afghanistan with the Northern Alliance, seizing Mazar-e-Sharif and attacking and 
occupying the major cities throughout Afghanistan.  After the initial effort in the 
                                            
59 Robin Moore, The Hunt for Bin Laden: Task Force Dagger-On the Ground with Special 
Forces in Afghanistan, Random House (New York: 2003), p. 267. 
60 Denis P. Doty, “Command and Control of Special Operations Forces for 21st Century 
Contingency Operations,” US Naval War College Department of Joint Military Operations, p. 10.  
61 Ibid., p. 11. 
62 Moore, The Hunt for Bin Laden, p. 296. 
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north, Special Forces would work with indigenous fighters in western Afghanistan 
to seize Kabul.  After the fall of Kabul, the focus of operations would shift to the 
Oruzgan province in the south with the Pashtuns, driving to Kandahar and in 
western Afghanistan to gain control of the city of Herat.   Special Forces 
Operational Detachment-Alpha 595 (SFODA 595) linked-up with General Rashid 
Dostum in the vicinity of Mazar-e-Sharif.  SFODA 555 met General Fahim Khan 
near the Bagram Airfield.63 
4. SFODA 595-In the North with General Dostum  
SFODA 595 received the mission to link-up with Northern Alliance General 
Abdul Rashid Dostum and conduct unconventional warfare in his support.64  
Planners deemed the capture of Mazar-e-Sharif critical as it controlled the land 
route south from Uzbekistan into northern Afghanistan and access to several 
airfields.  Upon meeting General Dostum, the SFODA set out to assist the 
fighters in capturing the Taliban stronghold of Mazar-e-Sharif and its adjacent 
airfield, splitting the 12-man Special Forces detachment into four three-man 
teams to accompany Dostum’s force, sometimes up to 18 hours away from each 
other by horse.65   
When notified by satellite communications that coalition leaders and US 
policymakers were growing impatient for results from the SFODA, the 
detachment commander drafted a message responding:  
I am advising a man on how to best employ light infantry and horse 
cavalry in the attack against Taliban Russian T-55 tanks, Russian 
armored personnel carriers, BTRs, mortars, artillery, ZSU anti-
aircraft guns and machine guns.  I can’t recall the US fighting like 
this since the Gatling gun destroyed Pancho Villa’s charges in the 
Mexican Civil War in the early 19th Century.66 
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64 “PBS Frontline: Campaign Against Terror: On the Ground: Working with the Warlords,” 
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SFODA 595 blended technology with techniques of cavalry warfare, 
calling air strikes on the enemy while the Northern Alliance fighters charged the 
Taliban lines on horseback.  Fighting daily engagements as they approached 
Marzar-e-Sharif in early November 2001, SFODA 595 realized that Dostum’s 
force lacked the number of men necessary to seize the town.  The Special 
Forces soldiers convinced several warlords to work together, most notably 
General Mohammed Atta, accompanied by SFODA 534, massing a sizeable 
force to attack Mazar-e-Sharif. 
We used the common bond of uniting their forces together from 
three ethnic factions-Hazaras, Tajiks and Uzbeks-who have all 
fought against each other, to unite against the Taliban.  And the 
Special Forces soldiers became the glue that are holding these 
ethnic factions together.67 
On 9 November 2001, Mazar-E-Sharif fell to the Northern Alliance, aided 
by their US Special Force counterparts, opening the land route from Uzbekistan 
into northern Afghanistan.  Days later, the Northern Alliance forces under 
General Mohammed Fahim Khan attacking south from Bagram, seized Kabul 
accompanied by SFODA 555.  The Special Forces soldiers then moved eastward 
to the city of Kunduz, the last major enemy-held urban area in Afghanistan.  After 
a pitched-battle with Taliban and al-Qaeda forces at Kunduz thousands of the 
enemy surrendered, giving control of northern Afghanistan to the Northern 
Alliance and the US-led coalition.   
5. SFODA 574-Unconventional Warfare with Hamid Karzai  
CPT Jason Amerine, detachment commander of SFODA 574 of A 
Company, 3rd Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) received the 
mission to conduct unconventional warfare against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in 
southern Afghanistan.   
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Our mission was to infiltrate the Oruzgan province, link up with 
Hamid Karzai and his Pashtun fighters, and advise and assist his 
forces in order to destabilize and eliminate the Taliban regime 
there.  More importantly, we were there to ensure that Al-Qaeda 
couldn’t operate in Afghanistan anymore.  We were going to make 
sure that Afghanistan was no longer a safe haven for terrorism.68 
SFODA 574 linked-up with Karzai in mid-November 2001, accompanying 
him throughout the Oruzgan province to help unify the ethnic Pashtun tribes of 
the region against the Taliban.   
As Karzai’s military advisors, the SFODA provided military legitimacy to 
the future Afghan leader as he sought to recruit ethnic Pashtuns to his cause.  
After arriving in the town of Tarin Kowt, recently abandoned by the Taliban, 
Karzai and the Special Forces soldiers received word that a large force of 
Taliban fighters were rapidly approaching the town.  Facing an estimated 500 
Taliban fighters in 100 vehicles moving north to Tarin Kowt from Kandahar, 
SFODA 574 used coalition close air support (CAS) to defeat the numerically 
superior enemy and avoid the loss of Hamid Karzai and the ethnic Pashtun 
village.  The victory over the Taliban immediately endeared the SFODA to the 
local Pashtun mullahs and their followers, while delivering a crushing 
psychological blow to the Taliban.69  The successful employment of CAS 
provided instant credibility for the SFODA with the anti-Taliban fighters, boosting 
their morale and confidence in the leadership of Hamid Karzai.   
On 29 November 2001, a larger command and control element, led by 
Special Forces battalion commander Lieutenant Colonel David Fox arrived to 
assist Hamid Karzai in the push to seize Kandahar.  Moving south from Tarin 
Kowt, the Special Forces element and the ethnic Pashtun force encountered 
resistance while occupying the village of Showali Kowt, just north of Kandahar.  
Calling coalition air to provide fires against a Taliban attack of approximately 100 
fighters on 5 December 2001, the Special Forces element misread the 
                                            
68 “PBS Frontline: Campaign Against Terror: Interview: US Army Captain Jason Amerine,” 
PBS, p. 2.  Available [Online]: <http: 
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/interviews/amerine.html> [28 July 2004]. 
69 Ibid., p. 8.  
38 
coordinates of the enemy position to the pilot.  The aircraft dropped a 2000 
pound Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) on the Special Forces observation 
post, killing three US soldiers and 27 Pashtun fighters.  While the ordnance 
narrowly missed killing Karzai, all SFODA members were wounded and 
medically evacuated from the battlefield.  Kandahar surrendered three days later.   
6. SFODA 572: Combat at Tora Bora 
As the Northern Alliance backed by US Special Forces and CAS steadily 
defeated the Taliban and al-Qaeda throughout Afghanistan, the remnants of the 
enemy forces retreated to the Tora Bora region, adjacent to the Pakistani border.  
Intelligence sources believed that Osama bin-Laden, mastermind of the 9/11 
attacks upon the United States, was located in the mountains of Tora Bora with a 
sizeable al-Qaeda force.  Anticipating that al-Qaeda would occupy and fight from 
suspected cave and tunnel complexes much as the mujahadeen had against the 
Soviet Army in the 1980s, coalition planners launched an operation to sweep the 
mountains to find and kill al-Qaeda forces.   
Multiple SOF elements from various services and nations converged on 
the foothills of Tora Bora to participate in the operation.  One SOF team, SFODA 
572 infiltrated into the Tora Bora region of Afghanistan, linking-up with Northern 
Alliance General Hazrat Ali, whose forces were already in contact with the 
Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters as they retreated into the Tora Bora mountains.70  
COL John Mulholland described the operation: 
Our function was to work with the [anti-Taliban Afghan] forces and 
increase their capability as much as possible to move into the 
mountains, and then re-apply air power up there to destroy these 
caves and to kill as many Al-Qaeda as possible.  [Al-Qaeda] wasn’t 
interested in surrendering, by and large.71 
The SFODA assessed the situation and coordinated CAS to cover the 
advance of the Northern Alliance fighters into the Tora Bora mountains as they 
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fought the enemy.  Other SOF elements also directed CAS from observation 
posts and covered likely escape routes out of the mountains.  With al-Qaeda and 
the Taliban on the run throughout the country, the Northern Alliance fighters 
failed to attack the enemy aggressively at Tora Bora, content to allow them to 
retreat.  Subsequently, an unknown number of al-Qaeda and Taliban combatants 
escaped through the Tora Bora range.  Although some question the success of 
the Tora Bora operation for the failure to seal off escape routes into Pakistan, the 
lack of aggressiveness by the Northern Alliance and the inability to net Osama 
bin-Laden, US Special Forces troops accomplished their mission of aiding 
General Ali and his fighting force to clear the cave complex.72 
The escape of an unknown number of al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters to 
Pakistan from the Tora Bora region led the coalition to question the effectiveness 
of the Northern Alliance fighters and would ultimately change the US strategy in 
Afghanistan.  When faced with a similar situation in Operation Anaconda, 
CENTCOM would send US conventional forces into the fight rather than 
indigenous troops.   
7. Operation Anaconda 
Following the Tora Bora operation, a group of Taliban and al-Qaeda 
fighters massed in the Shah-i-Kot Valley, located in the Paktia Province south of 
Kabul along the Pakistani border.  Coalition planners, estimating that the enemy 
in the Shah-i-Kot presented too difficult a target for the Northern Alliance fighters 
alone, decided to commit elements of the US 10th Mountain Division, a light 
infantry force and the 101st Airborne Division as the assault force, supported by 
other coalition ground units, aviation, and Special Forces.  Commanders dubbed 
the plan, to surround the Shah-i-Kot Valley and squeeze the enemy from all 
sides, Operation Anaconda.73  This marked the first large-scale use of coalition 
conventional forces since the beginning of the Afghanistan campaign in the fall of 
2001.   
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US Army Special Forces soldiers supported Operation Anaconda with 
eight SFODAs as part of the overall SOF package.  Several SFODAs led an 
Afghan Militia Force (AMF) of Pashtun fighters during Operation Anaconda to 
augment the conventional coalition forces and ensure host nation participation in 
the operation.74  Other SFODAs manned observation posts in the mountains 
ringing the valley, directing CAS onto pockets of enemy fighters and cave 
entrances as the conventional forces swept forward.  The bloody fight in the 
Shah-i-Kot began on 1 March 2002 and lasted a week with coalition forces 
meeting tenacious resistance from the well-entrenched enemy.  The coalition 
later estimated between 800 to 1000 al-Qaeda fighters participated in the battle 
that cost the coalition the highest number of dead and wounded of any fight in 
Afghanistan.  Operation Anaconda marked the significant integration of 
conventional and special operations forces during the war in Afghanistan as well 
as the point at which operations in Afghanistan shifted in focus from a special 
operations-centric campaign to a conventional coalition fight. 
8. Stability and Support Operations 
On March 15, 2002, following the completion of Operation Anaconda, 
Task Force Dagger redeployed to Fort Campbell, KY and the 3rd and 19th 
Special Forces Groups assumed the responsibility for Special Forces operations 
in Afghanistan.  SFODAs spread out throughout the country, under the command 
and control of company-level Special Operations Command and Control 
Elements (SOCCEs), gathering intelligence to aid in the pursuit of al-Qaeda 
fighters and members of the Taliban. 
As the priority of effort in Afghanistan shifted from SOF to conventional 
operations, Special Forces detachments and conventional coalition units began 
working together on a daily basis.  SFODAs spread out throughout the country,  
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reinforcing their living areas to create “firebases” from which they operated.  
Conventional US Army soldiers, operating in either platoon or squad strength, 
provided the security for the Special Forces soldiers at their firebases.75    
As the focus of special operations planners shifted from Afghanistan to 
Iraq in 2002, C/JSOTF-AF, the CJFSOCC fell under the control of 
Combined/Joint Task Force-180 (C/JTF-180), the conventional headquarters 
subordinate to CENTCOM, in May 2002.  Under this new command relationship, 
the majority of Special Forces missions required approval from both C/JSOTF-AF 
and C/JTF-180 prior to execution.  Many Special Forces soldiers speculate that 
the new mission approval process often constrained the ability of Special Forces 
units to react to time-sensitive intelligence and possibly contributed to the escape 
of high value targets that the coalition might otherwise have captured.  The 
freedom of Special Forces to operate throughout their assigned sectors also 
decreased with the “conventionalization” of the fight in Afghanistan.  Most 
SFODAs were required to operate within a 10 kilometer radius of their firebase, 
requiring permission from higher headquarters to travel further than that 
distance.76  
As each Special Forces team occupied its area of responsibility 
throughout Afghanistan, their mission required them to make contact with and 
develop a working relationship with the local populace.  Once the Special Forces 
soldiers gained the trust of the local people within a province, the people 
provided the Americans with information on the locations of suspected al-Qaeda 
or Taliban fighters as well as weapons caches.  Armed with this information, 
Special Forces personnel planned special reconnaissance missions to confirm or 
deny the validity of the information.  If deemed valid and verified by multiple 
independent sources, Special Forces could conduct a direct action (DA) mission  
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to capture or kill enemy personnel and seize weapons caches.  Intelligence 
operations, followed by DA missions continue to this day as the primary Special 
Forces missions in Afghanistan. 
Special Forces also played a role in the training of the Afghan National 
Army (ANA).  When policymakers decided to organize and train the ANA, CJTF-
180 developed a plan to train an initial cadre of Afghan soldiers that would, in 
turn, train other ANA units.  The responsibility for training the ANA fell to various 
coalition nations participating in Operation Enduring Freedom, with US Army 
Special Forces conducted the initial training for the ANA provided by the United 
States.  This task, however, was later delegated to civilian contractors.  The 
implications of this decision will be discussed in the following chapter.   
B. OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 
1. Setting the Stage 
The employment of SOF in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was 
revolutionary, marking the first time that planners, unable to bring conventional 
forces to bear against an armored and mechanized enemy threat, used large-
scale SOF forces in their place.  Turkey’s initial refusal to allow US forces to 
move through and fly through Turkish airspace constrained the ability of US 
planners to project conventional coalition forces into northern Iraq prior to the 
start of the war.  With northward movement towards Baghdad from Kuwait as the 
sole overland axis of advance available to conventional coalition forces, planners 
developed a plan to infiltrate Special Forces into northern and western Iraq in 
their place.  The coalition determined that two Combined/Joint Special 
Operations Task Forces (C/JSOTFs) conducting special operations in northern 
and western Iraq could sufficiently shape the battlefield in support of the 
conventional coalition attack from Kuwait.   
Operating in northern Iraq, C/JSOTF-North would link-up with Kurdish 
forces in the Kurdish Autonomous Zone and raid the Ansar al-Islam terrorist safe 
haven along the Iranian border in northeastern Iraq.  Following the assault 
against the terrorist group, C/JSOTF-North and their Kurdish counterparts would  
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turn south to fix and disrupt conventional Iraqi military forces arrayed along the 
forward edge of the battle area, called the Green Line, establishing the conditions 
for the seizure of the cities of Kirkuk and Mosul.   
C/JSOTF-West would infiltrate western Iraq from Jordan and conduct an 
area denial mission, seizing key airfields in the desert, securing infrastructure 
and sealing off the lines of communications leading to the Jordanian and Syrian 
borders to prevent the escape of fleeing Ba’athists.  C/JSOTF-West would also 
conduct an exhaustive hunt for Iraqi theater ballistic missiles (TBM) to prevent 
launches against Israel and Jordan.  With the attack by conventional coalition 
forces from the south and the employment of C/JSOTFs in the north and west, 
coalition commanders hoped to isolate Baghdad, slowly tightening the noose 
around the capital.   
Special Forces would also provide one battalion of the 5th SFG (A) to 
support the conventional attack north out of Kuwait.  Tasked with supporting the 
Shia minority in southern Iraq to conduct unconventional warfare, the battalion 
played a small role in the overall campaign.   
2. Command and Control 
The overall responsibility for special operations in OIF belonged to the 
Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command (CFSOCC).  
Formed from the headquarters of Special Operations Command-Central 
(SOCCENT), the CFSOCC provided command and control for both C/JSOTF-
North and C/JSOTF-West.  Following the transition from Decisive Operations to 
Stability and Support Operations, the CFSOCC disestablished C/JSOTF-North 
and redesignated C/JSOTF-West as C/JSOTF-Arabian Peninsula (C/JSOTF-
AP), moving the headquarters to Baghdad. 
3. C/JSOTF North 
C/JSOTF-North, codenamed Task Force (TF) Viking, initially moved from 
the US in February 2003, establishing a forward operating location in Constanta, 
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Romania, located on the Black Sea coast.77  Turkey’s refusal to authorize US 
overflights into Iraq led to a complicated infiltration, requiring a flight from 
Constanta to Jordan.  C/JSOTF-North aircraft encroached upon heavily defended 
Iraqi airspace from Jordan enroute to northern Iraq.  Despite taking considerable 
anti-aircraft fire, five of the six aircraft reached airfields in northern Iraq on the 
night of 22 to 23 March 2003.78  Under intense pressure from the US State 
Department, Turkey relented, allowing overflights into northern Iraq beginning on 
23 March. 
A brigade-sized special operations task force, C/JSOTF-North consisted 
of a mix of special operations and conventional combat and support units, 
numbering approximately 5,200 personnel.79  Three Special Forces battalions (2-
10 SFG, 3-10 SFG and 3-3 SFG) provided nine Special Forces companies, 
totaling 45 SFODAs.  An element of the 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry of the Fort 
Drum based 10th Mountain Division initially rounded out the task force.  The 
173d Airborne Brigade, based in Vicenza, Italy later arrived to reinforce 
C/JSOTF-North with two additional light infantry battalions, as well as an armored 
and mechanized force.      
C/JSOTF-North’s mission: 
On order, JSOTF-North conducts Unconventional Warfare and 
other Special Operations in JSOA (Joint Special Operations Area) 
North to disrupt Iraqi combat power, IOT (In order to) prevent 
effective military operations against CFLCC [Combined Forces 
Land Component Command] forces.80 
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Facing 13 Iraqi divisions, JSOTF-N sought to “disrupt Iraqi operational 
mobility and exploit operational success” through a combination of air 
interdiction, ground operations and information operations in support of the 
CFLCC push to isolate Baghdad.81 
Based upon their experiences employing US Army Special Forces in 
Operation Enduring Freedom, coalition planners ensured that Special Forces 
would play a key role in Operation Iraqi Freedom.  In order to shape the 
battlefield for coalition success, Special Forces would first link-up with ethnic 
Kurdish groups in northern Iraq opposed to the Saddam Hussein regime, 
recruiting an indigenous force with which they would conduct unconventional 
warfare.  Special Forces would then conduct a combined raid with the Kurds to 
destroy the Ansar al-Islam (AI) terrorist group, based along the Iranian border in 
northern Iraq.  Having eliminated the Islamists, C/JSOTF-North would then turn 
south to face the Iraqi divisions located along the Green Line to operationally 
disrupt the forces while the CFLCC moved north on Baghdad.  Working with 
conventional units as well as Kurdish allies, the ultimate objective of C/JSOTF-
North was the disruption of the Iraqi forces along the Green line as well as the 
seizure of the cities of Kirkuk and Mosul.   
C/JSOTF-N, commanded by the headquarters element of the 10th Special 
Forces Group (Airborne), from Fort Carson, Colorado commanded and controlled 
three Special Forces battalion-level Forward Operating Bases (FOBs), co-located 
with the major ethnic Kurdish groups in northern Iraq.  C/JSOTF-North conducted 
a delicate “balancing act”, leveraging Special Forces as the fulcrum point with 
which to manage three potentially volatile elements in northern Iraq: the enemy 
Iraqi forces, two rival factions of ethnic Kurds, and the Turkish military.82   
4. C/JSOTF West 
Special Forces and other SOF elements conducted a complex area denial 
operation in western Iraq, commanded and controlled by C/JSOTF-W, led by the 
command element of the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) from Fort 
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Campbell, Kentucky.  As in the first Gulf War, coalition planners deemed it 
essential to find and eliminate Saddam’s remaining SCUD missiles to prevent 
Israel from entering the war against Iraq.   
Infiltrating Iraq from Saudi Arabia and Jordan, elements of C/JSOTF-West 
systematically seized airfields in western Iraq to be used as staging areas for 
further operations.  Upon establishing a foothold in the west, elements of the 5th 
SFG (A) and other joint SOF units initiated an exhaustive SCUD hunt across the 
Iraqi western desert.  C/JSOTF-W forces additionally strove to cut-off land lines 
of communications to prevent the entry or exit of enemy forces from western Iraq, 
anticipating a flow of fleeing Ba’athists from the country.  Finally, C/JSOTF-W 
orchestrated various intelligence operations with the goal of capturing or killing 
Iraqis deemed high value targets.   
The employment of SOF to accomplish a screening mission normally 
assigned to a conventional division was a military first.  Upon the occupation of 
Baghdad by conventional forces, JSOTF-W relocated from the western desert to 
the Iraqi capital.   
5. UW with the Kurds 
A largely overlooked aspect of OIF is the Special Forces involvement with 
the Kurds in northern Iraq.  Occupying both sides of the border between Iraq and 
Turkey, the ethnic Kurds had long faced persecution from both the Turkish and 
Iraqi governments.  Prior to the invasion of Iraq the United States initiated 
diplomatic contact with the two major Kurdish elements in northern Iraq with 
three primary objectives in mind.  First, the US planned to conduct combined 
counterterrorism operations in northern Iraq to strike the Al-Qaeda-linked radical 
Islamic group Ansar al-Islam (AI), operating in a remote pocket of eastern Iraq, 
known as the Halabjah salient, along the Iranian border.83  Next, US planners 
hoped to open a northern front with Special Forces operating in concert with 
Kurdish forces to strike Iraqi units, estimated at sixty-percent of the combat force 
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of the Iraqi military, postured along the Green Line with enough combat power to 
keep them occupied in northern Iraq rather than reinforcing Baghdad against the 
coalition conventional ground assault from the south.  Finally, success along the 
Green Line would lead to the defeat of Iraqi forces and the occupation of the key 
cities of Mosul and Kirkuk and their adjacent oilfields.  Prevention of the Iraqi 
units manning the Green Line from reinforcing Baghdad was critical to ensuring 
the success of the coalition main effort from the south.   
The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), occupying the Iraqi provinces of 
Dohuk and Arbil, consisted of approximately 62,000 Kurd soldiers under the 
command of Masoud Barzani.84  The western portion of northern Iraq controlled 
by Barzani’s KDP was critical due to the city of Mosul, Iraq’s third largest city.  
Located south of the Green Line, occupied by Iraqi forces, Mosul provided 
access to numerous oil fields that coalition planners hoped to secure against 
destruction by retreating Iraqi forces. 
The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) consisted of an estimated 40,000 
soldiers, controlling the province of Sulamaniyah.85  Kurdish leader Jalal 
Talabani served as the Secretary-General of the PUK.  OIF planners deemed the 
eastern portion of the northern Iraq critical due to the access to oil fields 
estimated as supplying one-third of Iraq’s oil and the predominantly Kurd city of 
Kirkuk.86   
Reluctant to allow the opportunity for US support to slip away, Barzani and 
Talabani agreed to merge the KDP and PUK to form Joint Higher Leadership 
(JHL), unifying both parties in their struggle against the Iraqis.87  The JHL, co-
chaired by Barzani and Talabani allowed the US to deal with one consolidated                                             
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Kurd body, simplifying the military planning process to map out the seizure of 
Mosul, Kirkuk and the surrounding oil fields.  The JHL would provide 
approximately 60,000 Kurdish fighters, collectively known as peshmerga, or 
“those who face death”, to aid the US in the fight against Saddam Hussein.88  
The peshmerga would provide the indigenous force with which US Special 
Forces would conduct unconventional warfare. 
The first reports of US Special Forces on the ground in northern Iraq 
began in mid-February 2003, confirming the arrival of US commandos to link-up 
with peshmerga, laying the groundwork for the arrival of larger numbers of US 
forces.89  Following the first Gulf War, US Special Forces worked closely with the 
Kurds, providing much-needed humanitarian relief during Operation Provide 
Comfort (OPC).  The strong relationship built between Special Forces and the 
Kurds during OPC assisted the US personnel in rapidly rekindling the rapport and 
gaining the trust of the peshmerga.   
The purpose of the Special Forces, recently infiltrated into the three 
northern provinces of Iraq under the control of the Kurds, is to 
prepare the ground, by scouting and gathering intelligence, for a full 
scale-invasion.  The Kurds have always had up-to-the-minute 
information about the disposition, equipment and morale of the 1st 
and 5th Iraqi Army Corps that defend the strategically important 
cities of Mosul and Kirkuk.90 
The Turkish government, wishing to avoid a situation similar to the one 
that arose during the first Gulf War when an estimated 750,000 displaced Iraqi 
Kurds fled across the border to Turkey, threatened to deploy additional troops 
across its southern border into Iraq.  Fearing that Kurd autonomy in the wake of a 
US invasion might lead to an ethnic nationalist uprising by Kurds and instability 
within its own borders, Turkey threatened to occupy the city of Kirkuk with its own 
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military forces rather than allow its control by Kurdish forces.91  The Turks may 
also have desired access to the oil fields adjacent to Kirkuk as well.  After failing 
to secure Turkish permission to move US ground forces into Iraq through Turkey, 
US diplomats worked feverishly to convince Turkish officials that the US would 
not allow Kurdish forces to unilaterally occupy the cities of Mosul and Kirkuk.  
The US feared the possibility of friendly fire incidents with the Turks as well as 
the diversion of Kurd forces from fighting the Iraqis to fighting the Turks.    
Realizing that US Special Forces lacked the conventional force structure 
to deter a cross border incursion by the Turks, US planners considered other 
available options.  On 27 March 2003, the 1000 man-strong 173rd Airborne 
Brigade conducted a tactical night combat parachute assault into Bashur Airfield 
in northern Iraq to add a conventional punch to US forces in the north and send a 
message to Turkey.  The 173rd Airborne Brigade, based in Vicenza, Italy, faced 
no resistance on the ground during its consolidation and would later be assigned 
as a subordinate unit to C/JSOTF-North. 
6. Operation Viking Hammer- Counterterrorism Against Ansar al-
Islam (AI)-(28-30 March 2003)  
Allegedly relocating to northern Iraq from Afghanistan following the US 
invasion in 2001, AI conducted numerous terrorist operations against the PUK 
from its complex of 16 villages in the Halabjah salient along the Iraq-Iran 
border.92  Hoping to keep the Kurds off-balance in the north, Saddam Hussein 
allegedly supported AI with funding and weapons, enabling the organization to 
continue terrorizing the Kurds in their rear area thus relieving pressure against 
Iraqi forces on the Green Line.  Considering AI a significant threat, the PUK 
maintained 10,000 peshmerga fighters near the Halabjah salient, diverting a 
significant amount of potential combat power from the conventional Iraqi divisions 
                                            
91 Daniel Williams, “US Troops Working With Kurdish Fighters: Groups May Help Special 
Forces Plan Airstrikes for Advance Into Northern Iraq,” Washington Post, Kurdistan Observer (17 
March 2003).  Available [Online]: <http://home.cogeco.ca/~dbonni1/18-3-03-us-to-coordinates-
with-kurds.html> [02 August 2004]. 
92 “US Condemns Murder of PUK Commander, Vows to Fight Group Held Responsible,” 
AFP, Kurdistan Observer, (10 February 2003).  Available [Online]: 
<http://home.cogeco.ca/~observer/10-2-03-us-condemns-murder-of-puk-leader.html> [02 August 
04]. 
50 
along the Green Line.93  The PUK would not commit the fighters arrayed against 
AI to the effort along the Green Line until the terrorist threat to their rear was 
eliminated.94  In his address to the United Nations in early February 2003, US 
Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that the US suspected AI of manufacturing 
chemical weapons in its isolated stronghold and expressed concern over the link 
between AI and Al-Qaeda operative Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.95  AI’s estimated 
strength at that time stood at between 800-1000 fighters.96  AI’s suspected 
involvement in production of chemical weapons and terrorist operations resulted 
in the diversion of peshmerga forces from the Green Line made AI the first 
ground target for C/JSOTF-North.   
In one of the most dramatic yet least known operations of OIF, the 
coalition opened a division-sized ground attack against AI consisting of Kurdish 
peshmerga led by US Army Special Forces on 28 March 2003, following a 
preliminary attack with 64 Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs) and air 
strikes against suspected terrorist locations.97   
Six columns of 1000 peshmerga each, advanced along six 
separate axes of attack.  Each column had Special Forces soldiers 
along the column commander and spread through his subordinate 
units.  Four thousand additional peshmerga secured the flanks or 
waited in reserve.98 
The columns advanced rapidly, forcing the AI fighters to retreat by 
aggressive ground maneuver and close air support.  Unable to fight an effective 
delaying action against the coalition force, AI found itself in an all-out retreat to  
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survive.  The second day of the operation witnessed the defeat of AI and the 
escape of its leaders into Iran as coalition forces moved forward, attacking 
Iranian border guards assisting the fleeing terrorists.99   
The success of Operation Viking Hammer yielded several positive effects 
for the coalition.  First, the operation defeated one of the largest terrorist groups 
in the world.  Second, the operation increased the credibility of the Special 
Forces soldiers with the peshmerga after the Kurds witnessed US firepower in 
action in the form of cruise missiles and close air support platforms.  Next, the 
raid upon the terrorist complex provided the peshmerga with confidence in their 
fighting ability, adding immeasurably to their morale.100  Finally, the operation 
against AI freed up an estimated 10,000 peshmerga, who now eagerly joined the 
Special Forces soldiers moving south to the Green Line for disruption operations 
against Iraqi forces postured on the Green Line. 
7. On the Green Line 
Facing 13 Iraqi divisions, a full sixty-percent of the Iraqi military, arrayed 
along the Green Line, C/JSOTF-North developed a plan to disrupt the enemy’s 
operational center of gravity by targeting the three units deemed the greatest 
threat: the Adnan Republican Guard Division, the Nebbuchadnezzar Division and 
the 3rd Armor Division.101  C/JSOTF-North employed the SFODAs of three 
Special Forces battalions along with their peshmerga counterparts to accomplish 
the mission.  C/JSOTF-North and the ethnic Kurds attacked up and down the 
length of the Green Line, conducting ground maneuver supported by terminal 
guidance operations (TGO) to strike Iraqi positions and vehicles with precision 
guided munitions (PGMs).  Further complicating the fight in the north, the 
C/JSOTF needed to ensure that the engaged Iraqi units would not move south to 
reinforce Baghdad against the coalition main effort advancing from the south.  
Seizing town after town as they pushed the Green Line steadily south, C/JSOTF-
North and the Kurds engaged in some of the fiercest fighting of the war, even 
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enveloping the Iraqi forces through maneuver south of Kirkuk, cutting off the lines 
of communications to Baghdad and forcing the enemy to flee west towards 
Tikrit.102    
With the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kirkuk the inevitable looting 
began.  Coalition commanders, hoping to avoid a Turkish military operation to 
prevent the peshmerga from occupying Kirkuk, yet determined to prevent looting 
and the subsequent loss of public services, attempted to move coalition units 
north to Kirkuk from Baghdad but found the task impossible due to enemy 
resistance.  C/JSOTF-North and Kurd units entered the town of Kirkuk on 10 
April 2003, despite Turkish protests and threats.  The Turks responded by 
massing forces along the Iraqi border and the Kurds began redeploying forces to 
the north to face the emerging Turkish threat.  C/JSOTF-North now found itself 
embroiled in an almost unimaginable situation, “the likelihood of an outbreak of 
fighting between a US-equipped guerrilla force who was a key ally during the war 
and a NATO ally.”103    
Working rapidly to secure the oilfields surrounding Kirkuk as well as the 
city itself, C/JSOTF-North flooded the area with as many US soldiers as possible 
to demonstrate coalition control over the city and dispel Turkish-generated 
rumors of ethnic violence and massacres directed towards Turkmen residing in 
Kirkuk.  The increased US presence helped calm the volatile ethnic situation in 
Kirkuk.  Two days later, the 173d Airborne Brigade arrived to occupy Kirkuk with 
its attached armor and mechanized forces.   
Occupying the city of Mosul, the Iraqi V Corps withdrew from its positions 
as C/JSOTF-North and the peshmerga of the KDP fought their way towards the 
third-largest city in Iraq.  With the surrender of the V Corps, Special Forces and 
their Kurd allies entered Mosul on 11 April 2004, in an effort to stop looting and  
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bring order to the city.  After several days C/JSOTF-North handed the city over to 
the 101st Airborne Division and elements of the 26th Marine Corps Expeditionary 
Unit.   
8. Stability and Support Operations 
Following the defeat of the Iraqi Army, the US military transitioned to 
stability and support operations (SASO) throughout the country.  As the 
insurgency gained momentum, coalition leaders focused their Special Forces 
assets on a counterinsurgency (COIN) mission.104  As the situation in the north 
with the Kurds stabilized and more conventional coalition forces moved into the 
area, the Special Forces battalions continued supporting their peshmerga allies 
with liaison teams and conducted intelligence operations to find fugitive members 
of the outlawed Ba’ath Party.  Although units from C/JSOTF-North remained in 
place in northern Iraq, C/JSOTF-North was disestablished as a headquarters as 
C/JSOTF-West moved to Baghdad and became C/JSOTF-Arabian Peninsula 
(CJSOTF-AP), assuming command and control of special operations in Iraq.105 
The hunt for former members of the Saddam Hussein regime, known as 
high-value targets (HVTs), became the centerpiece of the COIN mission.  Special 
Forces companies set up company-level headquarters, known as Advanced 
Operational Bases (AOBs), providing command and control to the SFODAs  
subordinate to them.106  Responsible for a particular geographic area, the AOBs 
and SFODAs now assumed the COIN mission to find, capture or kill HVTs within 
their area of operations.107   
                                            
104 Joint Pub 3-07.1, Joint Tactics Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense, 
defines counterinsurgency as “Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and 
civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency.  Also called COIN.”  COIN exists a 
subtask of Foreign Internal Defense (FID). 
105 Patrick Flood, “Special Ops Signal Battalion Provides Special Support for Operation Iraqi 
Freedom,” Army Communicator, p. 4. Available [Online]: 
<http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PAA/is_3_28/ai_111464903/print> [18 August 
2004]. 
106 The Special Forces company headquarters staffing the AOB is the same as the Special 
Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE) described in earlier chapters.  When the 
company headquarters operates subordinate to the battalion headquarters, known as a Forward 
Operating Base (FOB), the company headquarters is referred to as an AOB.  When deployed to 
command and control subordinate detachments in support of a conventional headquarters, the 
company headquarters becomes a SOCCE. 
54 
Using the Joint Combined Observer (JCO) targeting methodology 
originally devised by COL Charlie Cleveland in Bosnia, the AOBs began creating 
their own databases of influential and suspicious personnel throughout their area 
of operation.  The AOBs conducted COIN-specific intelligence preparation of the 
battlefield (IPB) by analyzing types of insurgent incidents with the location and 
timing of the incidents to establish an operational pattern for insurgent targets.  
Likewise, the Special Forces soldiers analyzed associations between suspected 
insurgents and known insurgents and their supporters to establish formal and 
informal links between individuals within their area of responsibility.108  The use 
of these analytical techniques, along with the ability of the Special Forces 
personnel to get out into the communities and meet with the local citizens,  
helped demonstrate insurgent organizational relationships and focused the 
Special Forces targeting process.  This analysis occurred at both the AOB and 
SFODA levels. 
Due to the multiple special operations underway to locate, capture or kill 
HVTs, the AOBs and SFODAs found it necessary to create their own intelligence 
picture of their area of responsibility using the techniques described above.  The 
Special Forces soldiers could then conduct DA operations based upon the 
intelligence they had developed within their own sector.  It was reported that 
ninety-nine percent of the DA missions conducted by Special Forces in Iraq were 
based upon intelligence developed at the company level or below.109  The 
intelligence was bottom-driven rather than coming down from higher 
headquarters. 
The Special Forces integration with conventional units also progressed 
during the SASO phase of OIF.  AOBs, now operating within the sectors 
assigned to conventional units, conducted daily coordination with division-level 
operations cells and exchanged information with the division intelligence 
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elements.  Conventional units provided cordon forces and security for Special 
Forces elements conducting DA missions, leveraging maneuver and firepower in 
the form of infantry platoons, tanks, and attack helicopters to support the Special 
Forces operations.  Special Forces soldiers living on the economy in hardened 
“safehouses” often received an infantry squad to provide additional protection 
and reinforce the SFODA.110  COIN operations remain the primary mission of 
Special Forces personnel in Iraq with greater emphasis upon intelligence 
collection and exploitation. 
Building upon the lessons learned during their experience in the Balkans, 
Special Forces employment and operations evolved during Operation Enduring 
Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.  The primary instrument of DoD in 
ground operations in Afghanistan, several hundred Special Forces soldiers 
working with indigenous groups and augmented by close air support overthrew 
the Taliban government in less than two months.  Transitioning to 
counterinsurgency operations in December 2001, Special Forces led the hunt for 
fleeing members of al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime.  Largely based upon their 
successful employment in Afghanistan, Special Forces opened the campaign in 
northern Iraq during OIF, destroying one of the largest terrorist groups in the 
world and disrupting sixty-percent of the Iraqi military along the Green Line, again 
with native guerrilla fighters and close air support.  The following chapter will 
analyze the evolution of Special Forces from the Balkans to Iraq, focusing upon 
the decision of policymakers to employ Special Forces and the specific areas of 
Special Forces intelligence operations, the roles of foreign internal defense and 
unconventional Warfare, close air support, integration with conventional units and 
the institutionalization of lessons learned.    
  




























This chapter analyzes the evolution of Special Forces operations from the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Implementation Force (IFOR) mission 
in the Balkans through Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan to 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).  The section begins by examining the reasons 
Special Forces were chosen by policymakers as the force of choice for OEF and 
OIF, followed by analysis of the evolution of Special Forces intelligence 
operations, unconventional warfare (UW) and Foreign Internal Defense (FID), 
employment of close air support (CAS) and Special Forces integration with 
conventional forces.  This chapter concludes with an analysis of the 
institutionalization of experience and lessons learned and its impact upon future 
Special Forces operations. 
The evolution of Special Forces began in the Balkans where they 
performed a minimal, supporting role, slowly coming to the notice of conventional 
commanders through the success of their missions and the quality of the 
intelligence they produced.  Their integration with and value to conventional 
commanders increased through operations in Kosovo.  In Afghanistan, Special 
Forces became one of the primary workhorses in the Special Operations Forces 
(SOF)-centric initial combat phase, working with Northern Alliance warlords and 
contributing to the overthrow of the Taliban regime.  In Iraq, Special Forces once 
again shared the stage with conventional forces, but received the mission to 
control the northern and western portions of the country, shaping the battlespace 
for conventional coalition success in the south.  
B. WHY PLANNERS CHOSE TO EMPLOY SPECIAL FORCES IN OEF 
AND OIF 
CENTCOM planners chose to employ Special Forces in Afghanistan for a 
variety of reasons.  First and foremost, the change of attitudes towards the 
military that occurred between the Clinton to the Bush administration, specifically 
that of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, may very likely have contributed 
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to the decision to employ Special Forces in Afghanistan.  Secondly, no campaign 
plan existed for a conventional military operation in Afghanistan and the US could 
not respond with the speed desired by the President with a phased-deployment 
of large conventional units into theater.  This, coupled with the geographic 
constraints of Afghanistan, the initial lack of basing in neighboring countries, the 
loosely-organized Taliban and terrorist group al-Qaeda all contributed to making 
Special Forces the force of choice for the opening phases of OEF.      
When asked how military operations in the 1990s, specifically Somalia, 
Bosnia and Kosovo influenced his decision on how to employ forces in 
Afghanistan, CENTCOM commander General Tommy Franks replied that while 
he had considered these operations, the history of Afghanistan, more than any 
other factor, influenced his decision to not immediately commit large numbers of 
conventional troops to the battlefield.111  Franks looked at the hard lessons 
learned by the Soviets during their operations in Afghanistan and sought to avoid 
the same pitfalls.    
It’s always been somewhat interesting to me to see the views of 
some of the pundits who have suggested the introduction of large 
conventional forces in Afghanistan.  I think a great many people are 
aware, and I know you’re aware of the fact that for some 10 or 11 
years of Soviet experience in Afghanistan, they introduced 625,000 
people on the ground, and had 15,000 of them killed and 55,000 of 
them wounded.  So we took that as instructive--as the way not to 
do it.112 
Elaborating on his rationale, Gen Franks commented on the decision to 
employ unconventional forces in Afghanistan: 
I think all of us recognized that there are a variety of ways to either 
apply force or threaten the application of force.  One is cruise 
missiles.  Another is the introduction of large conventional forces.  
The Soviets tried it, and didn’t like it.  Another approach is the  
                                            
111 “PBS Frontline: Campaign Against Terror: Interviews: US Army General Tommy Franks,” 
PBS, p. 2.  Available: [Online]:  
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/interviews/franks.html> [28 July 
2004]. 
112 Ibid., p. 4. 
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unconventional approach, which seeks to leverage operational 
forces, air-to-ground forces, air support, that sort of kinetic activity 
by putting people on the ground close enough to observe the  
targets one would like them to destroy.  That approach is certainly 
unconventional at the level at which the operation in Afghanistan 
moved forward.113 
The decision by planners to open OEF with air and SOF sets the 
campaign apart from all others conducted by the US, by designating SOF as the 
main effort on the ground.  The decision to exclude conventional ground forces 
from the fight provided Special Forces the flexibility and freedom of maneuver 
required on a non-contiguous battlefield to rapidly react and defeat the enemy in 
less than two months.  Unlike any other conflict, SOF entered the war in 
Afghanistan as the supported force, rather than its traditional employment as a 
supporting force to conventional operations.   
One potential weakness of the employment of SOF with no conventional 
ground forces is that numerous Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders likely escaped.  
Lacking vehicles for ground mobility and adequate number of soldiers to seal off 
the porous borders, the sole use of SOF in the campaign may have contributed 
to the escape of numerous high value targets.  Following Operation Anaconda, 
SOF once again reverted to a supporting force rather than the supported force. 
Lacking the ability to project a significant conventional force into northern 
Iraq without the use of Turkey as an overland route prior to Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, CENTCOM chose to insert Combined/Joint Special Operations Task 
Force-North (C/JSOTF-North) into the area along the Turkish border to conduct 
UW with the ethnic Kurds.  Unable to infiltrate a conventional force into the 
western desert to conduct an area denial mission, CENTCOM tasked C/JSOTF-
West to locate and prevent SCUD missile launches and cut-off lines of 
communications from central Iraq to Syria for fleeing members of the Saddam 
Hussein regime.   
                                            
113 Ibid., p. 2.  
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The significance of assigning responsibility to two C/JSOTFs for the 
control western and northern Iraq in place of conventional forces cannot be 
overstated.  In northern Iraq, C/JSOTF-North led a division-level assault by 
Kurdish fighters with US air and ground support to destroy a terrorist complex 
and received a conventional brigade as support.  Special Forces provided a level 
of agility and adaptability not found in conventional force.  Paired with 
interpersonal skills, cultural awareness and the ability to operate in uncertain 
conditions, these all combined to make SF the force of choice in OEF and OIF.  
One factor contributing to the success of Special Forces operations in the 
Balkans as well as during the stability and support (SASO) phase of OEF and 
OIF was the evolution of Special Forces intelligence operations. 
C. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS  
Intelligence operations pioneered during Special Forces operations in 
Bosnia and Kosovo continued their evolution during OEF and OIF.  Analysis of 
the operations conducted by Special Forces from the Balkans to OEF and OIF 
demonstrate a distinct trend away from the traditional “top-driven” intelligence, 
gathered and evaluated at higher command levels and disseminated to lower 
units, to a “bottom-driven” intelligence system based upon collection and 
exploitation of information at the user level.   
Rather than relying upon higher headquarters for information, Special 
Forces operators cultivated and developed their own intelligence sources, 
planning and executing company and detachment-level missions based upon 
self-generated information.  An analysis of operations from Bosnia to Iraq clearly 
demonstrates a trend indicating that as the operational environment became less 
permissive, Special Forces were allowed to conduct more of their own operations 
based upon intelligence generated at the unit level.  Conventional commanders 
and headquarters seemed more likely to allow Special Forces more flexibility and 




Intelligence operations conducted by Special Forces in the Balkans were 
generally urban and conducted in a permissive environment.  Conventional 
commanders employed Joint Commission Observer (JCO) teams in Bosnia and 
later, Liaison Teams (LT) in Kosovo, tasking Special Forces soldiers to monitor 
the mood of local communities and identify influential people from local 
government, military, religious, and ethnic groups.  By living among the various 
communities and interacting on a daily basis with the local ethnic groups, the 
Special Forces personnel maintained an open line of communication between 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) commanders and prominent 
individuals, enabling the conventional commanders to defuse potentially 
explosive situations before they occurred.   
NATO Implementation Force (IFOR), Stabilization Force (SFOR) and 
Kosovo Force (KFOR) commanders used the information generated by the 
Special Forces teams to maintain stability within their sectors.  In Kosovo, 
conventional commanders for the first time allowed SFODAs to plan and execute 
time-sensitive operations based upon intelligence gathered in their areas, such 
as the joint raid conducted by SFODA 095 with the Russian 13th Task Group and 
the demobilization of the Sefer Faction of the Liberation Army of Presheva, 
Medvegja and Bujanoc (UCPMB) by SFODA 086.   
Following Operation Anaconda, in the spring of 2002, SFODAs deployed 
throughout Afghanistan, continuing the hunt for al-Qaeda terrorists and members 
of the Taliban regime. Special Forces began conducting intelligence operations 
in a primitive, largely rural setting, in a semi-permissive environment.  Arriving in 
their operational areas, the Special Forces soldiers developed relationships with 
local tribal warlords and the citizens of the area, largely mirroring the JCO and LT 
model from the Balkans.  Conducting a counterinsurgency (COIN) mission, 
Special Forces generated information from interaction with the population, at the 
company and detachment levels, to identify fugitive al-Qaeda fighters or former 
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members of the Taliban regime within their particular area of operation.114  If 
verified through multiple sources and approved by conventional commanders, 
Special Forces soldiers were allowed to conduct direct action (DA) missions 
based upon the intelligence collected.  
In Iraq, Special Forces teams conducted similar intelligence operations, 
again based upon the JCO model, developing their own intelligence at the 
company or detachment levels.  Intelligence gathered in raids conducted during 
the initial combat phase in Iraq often led to immediate follow-on missions based 
upon the target identified by the information.  As the mission shifted to COIN 
during the stability and support phase of OIF, Special Forces soldiers typically 
operated in a non-permissive, urban setting.  Using COIN-focused intelligence 
preparation of the battlefield (IPB), and greater reliance upon pattern analysis to 
identify key figures within the insurgency, Special Forces personnel rapidly 
reacted to information, conducting DA missions to capture or kill high-value 
targets (HVTs) based upon self-generated information. 
Recent operations have shown the value of SF in supporting 
intelligence collection efforts.  The ability to build rapport and 
operate amongst the indigenous population has enabled SF to 
provide important human intelligence to support force protection, 
SOF intelligence requirements, and joint force intelligence 
requirements.  Language skills and regional expertise continue to 
be critical skills for SF soldiers to conduct these missions.115 
This same type of COIN-focused IPB contributed to the capture of 
Saddam Hussein in Operation Red Dawn in December 2003.116  The success of 
Special Forces intelligence operations during the SASO phases of OEF and OIF 
all build upon lessons learned in the Balkans.  
                                            
114 Joint Publication 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal 
Defense, defines counterinsurgency as “those military, paramilitary, political, economic, 
psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency.  Also called 
COIN.” 
115 Paul A. Ott, Unconventional Warfare in the Contemporary Operating Environment: 
Transforming Special Forces, A Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States 
Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, AY 01-02, p. 37.   
116 Robin Moore, Hunting Down Saddam: The Inside Story of the Search and Capture, St 
Martins Press, (New York: 2004), p. 241. 
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D. FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE (FID) AND UNCONVENTIONAL 
WARFARE (UW) 
The conduct of FID and UW operations by Special Forces has evolved 
from operations in the Balkans through Afghanistan to Iraq.  Joint Publication 3-
07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense, 
defines FID as:   
participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in 
any of the action programs taken by another government or other 
designated organization to free and protect its society from 
subversion, lawlessness and insurgency.  Also called FID.117 
FID includes the application of diplomatic, informational, military and 
economic measures by both civilian and military forces in support of a friendly 
government.  Three military FID programs exist: indirect support, direct support 
(not including combat operations), and combat operations.118  COIN operations 
exist as a subset of FID, directly meeting the definition through US support to a 
friendly government to overcome an insurgency and may be conducted in any of 
the three military FID programs.  Although many Special Forces FID operations 
may incorporate unconventional tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP), they 
are not, by definition, nor should they be confused with, unconventional warfare 
operations.   
Joint Publication 3-05.5, Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission 
Planning Procedures, defines UW as:  
A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally 
of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by 
indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, 
equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an 
external source.  It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct 
                                            
117 Joint Publication 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal 
Defense, (30 April 2004), p. GL-7.  Available [Online]: 
<http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_07_1.pdf> [19 August 2004].   
118 Ibid., p. I-4.  “Indirect Support focuses on building strong national infrastructures through 
economic and military capabilities that contribute to self-sufficiency.” (p. I-5).  Direct Support 
(Not Involving Combat Operations): “these operations involve the use of US forces providing 
direct assistance to the HN (host nation) civilian populace or military.” (p. I-11).  US Combat 
Operations: “The introduction of US combat forces into FID operations requires a Presidential 
decision and serves only as a temporary solution until HN forces are able to stabilize the situation 
and provide security for the populace.” (p. I-13-I-14).       
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offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as 
the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, 
and evasion and escape.  Also called UW.119 
UW generally provides US support to indigenous resistance forces in 
order to overthrow a hostile foreign government or regime.  Once the hostile 
government has been overthrown and a new government has assumed power, 
US support to that government, by definition, becomes FID.  One of the most 
common FID missions in support of a new government upon assumption of 
power has traditionally been COIN.  While conventional units may conduct FID, 
US Army Special Forces exists as the only force in the US military organized, 
trained, equipped and chartered to conduct UW and FID since its establishment 
in the 1950s.  
While Special Forces provided intelligence and communications support to 
the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) from Albania during Operation Allied Force, by 
definition they performed the FID mission of Direct Support (Not Involving 
Combat Operations), rather than UW.  The demobilization of the UCPMB’s Sefer 
Faction by SFODA 086 in Kosovo in support of KFOR also meets the criteria for 
FID, rather than UW.  Despite the employment of unconventional TTP by Special 
Forces, support to the KLA and the demobilization of the Sefer Faction were FID 
missions. 
Combat operations by Special Forces soldiers with the Northern Alliance 
during the initial phase of OEF meet the criteria for UW.  Some may argue that 
the operations conducted with the Northern Alliance were FID due to numerous, 
large force-on force, direct-fire engagements.  However, as Special Forces 
sought the overthrow of the existing government within the country with, by, or 
through indigenous forces, the operations meet the definition of UW.  Following 
the overthrow of the Taliban and the establishment of a new Afghan government  
                                            
119 Joint Publication 3-05.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special 
Operations Targeting and Mission Planning, (21 May 2003), p. GL-16.  Available [Online]:  
<http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_05_2.pdf> [19 August 2004].   
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in December 2001, coalition operations supported the new government against 
an insurgency, thus the mission shifted from UW to FID, specifically COIN in 
December 2001.120   
On the opposite end of the spectrum from successful UW operations with 
the Northern Alliance, the US learned a hard lesson on the employment of the 
indigenous fighters at Tora Bora.  Conducting a FID mission at Tora Bora, the 
Special Forces soldiers could not motivate the indigenous troops to attack the 
well-entrenched and well-armed al-Qaeda fighters.  A likely factor behind their 
lack of motivation is that the campaign had shifted heavily in favor of the US and 
the Northern Alliance by the time of the action.  Subsequently, the Northern 
Alliance fighters could not link the destruction of al-Qaeda to their survival as 
they had at the outset of OEF.  The use of indigenous troops, lacking the 
motivation that US soldiers may have possessed in the same operation, likely led 
to the escape of numerous al-Qaeda personnel.    
The training of the Afghan National Army (ANA) also qualifies as FID as it 
involves organizing, training, advising, and equipping the fighting force.  
Contractors have now assumed the training of the ANA, a mistake, in the 
estimation of one Special Forces officer,  
I think we [US Army Special Forces] should be taking the ANA from 
‘cradle to grave’.  We should be building their Army, then, with 
those we have conducted training with, execute combat operations.  
As you know, there are contractors and others that do this mission 
right now, and this takes away from one of our core missions.121 
The obvious advantage of the ‘cradle to grave’ training concept is that it 
builds a strong relationship between the Afghan soldiers and the Special Forces 
trainers, in essence, providing an indigenous fighting force capable of conducting 
COIN, advised by US Special Forces soldiers. 
                                            
120 Author email correspondence with a US Army Special Forces Major, wishing to remain 
anonymous, 19 August 2004.  This officer currently commands a Special Forces AOB in 
Afghanistan.   
121 Ibid., 19 August 2004.  
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Initial Special Forces operations in Iraq conducted with the Kurdish 
peshmerga fighters to overthrow the existing government meets the definition of 
UW.  Used first as the primary ground force for the destruction of the Ansar al-
Islam terrorist group followed by operations against conventional Iraqi military 
forces, the Special Forces experience of UW with the Kurds succeeded due to 
detailed planning beginning in August 2002 and the use of pilot teams to assess 
the capabilities, limitations and needs of the peshmerga prior to the arrival of the 
main body of C/JSOTF-North in Iraq.122  Upon the seizure of Kirkuk and Mosul in 
the north, coupled with the defeat of the Iraqi military and the fall of the Iraqi 
government, the Special Forces mission changed from UW to FID with an 
emphasis on COIN to help stabilize the country and support the US-sponsored 
provisional government.  SOF also became the supporting force in northern Iraq 
as opposed to the supported force they had been during initial combat 
operations.   
Prior to OEF and OIF, the US military had not conducted extensive UW 
and COIN missions since the conflict in Vietnam.  Special Forces provided the 
only capability within the military capable of conducting effective UW in both 
Afghanistan and Iraq.  Special Forces, although capable, depended heavily upon 
close air support to maximize their effectiveness as a combat multiplier and 
defeat numerically superior forces.   
E. CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (CAS)    
CAS has played a pivotal role in the evolution of Special Forces from the 
Balkans to Iraq.  Four overarching results of the Special Forces employment of 
CAS are common to Special Forces operations with the KLA during Operation 
Allied Force, with the Northern Alliance in OEF and with the ethnic Kurdish 
peshmerga fighters in OIF.   
First, CAS improved the ability of Special Forces to function as combat 
multipliers, exponentially increasing the lethality of a small group of soldiers with 
                                            
122 Special Forces UW doctrine calls for advanced elements of Special Forces soldiers to 
infiltrate denied areas and assess the capabilities of a potential resistance organization.  These 
UW assessments are conducted by pilot teams.   
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radios to bring devastating effects to bear upon a numerically superior enemy 
force.  Second, the ability of Special Forces soldiers and their attached USAF 
Tactical Air Control (TAC) personnel to accurately observe and report targets and 
conduct battle damage assessment to gauge the effects of CAS maximized the 
lethality of airborne platforms as opposed to unobserved or uncontrolled 
bombing.  Third, the employment of CAS provided the Special Forces soldiers 
with instant credibility with indigenous ground forces, enabling them to rapidly 
build rapport, gaining the trust and confidence of their allies in order to maximize 
their effectiveness as a fighting force.  Lastly, CAS bolstered the confidence and 
the morale of indigenous ground forces, rallying more fighters to support combat 
operations, generating more combat power against the enemy.   
As the US military undertook Operation Allied Force in 1999, policymakers 
debated the level of support the US should provide the KLA.  Aided by US 
intelligence, communications support and NATO aircraft, the KLA conducted 
successful combat operations in Kosovo against the Serbs during Operation 
Allied Force in the spring of 1999.  The combination of pressure on the ground, 
coupled with the NATO air campaign contributed to the capitulation of Serb 
combat forces and their ultimate withdrawal from Kosovo.  Although US Special 
Forces operating on the Albanian border provided support to the KLA by relaying 
targets from the guerrillas in Kosovo to the Task Force Hawk headquarters in 
Tirana, the Special Forces soldiers never communicated directly with NATO 
aircraft.  By not allowing the Special Forces personnel to target Serb forces 
directly through communications with the aircraft, decision-makers likely believed 
they were removing US forces from direct responsibility of the outcome of the 
missions.  The US air support also had a psychological impact upon the KLA, 
improving their morale and emboldening their efforts against the Serbs, while 
demonstrating NATO resolve to ethnic Albanian Kosovars.    
Fighting on a non-contiguous, rather than a linear battlefield, Special 
Forces initially lacked priority of support for CAS early in the Afghanistan 
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campaign.123  Once coalition planners saw the success of Special Forces UW 
operations with the Northern Alliance, they diverted CAS to support Special 
Forces elements in contact with the enemy, calling the support Ground-Directed 
Interdiction (GDI), rather than allocate pre-planned CAS to support the ground 
operations.124  The availability of aircraft for GDI contributed to the ultimate 
downfall of the Taliban, but its initial employment by Special Forces was not 
without its challenges.   
Task Force Dagger’s first few teams deployed without terminal 
attack controllers-Air Force troops trained and certified to control 
CAS.  During the first few days of combat, unsuccessful CAS 
revealed how important it is to have experts on the ground 
immediately.  Task Force Dagger’s commander quickly deployed 
trained ground controllers who had an immediate, positive effect on 
the campaign.  Within days, every Special Forces team had a 
qualified terminal attack controller [TAC]…125   
CAS allowed the Special Forces soldiers to establish immediate credibility 
with the Northern Alliance warlords and their fighters during the initial phase of 
combat operations in Afghanistan, bolstering the confidence of the indigenous 
resistance movement and adding momentum to the fight against the Taliban.   
The rapid advance of the Northern Alliance against the Taliban 
shows the tremendous asymmetry created by a small element 
capable of synergistically linking low-tech opposition ground forces 
with overwhelming US air power technology (i.e. precision guided 
munitions).126 
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Unfortunately, several fratricide incidents still occurred.  Following the 
special operations-centric phase of OEF, planners realized the shortcomings of 
SOF integration with joint fires and took numerous measures to correct 
shortcomings identified during OEF.127 
Building upon lessons learned in OEF, SOF effectively integrated with joint 
fires in OIF.  SFODAs infiltrating into Iraq deployed with TACs to ensure efficient 
GDI.  In northern Iraq, Special Forces teams conducting unconventional warfare 
with the Kurds maximized the use of GDI in the destruction of Ansar al-Islam (AI), 
employing precision guided munitions and B-52 strikes during the day and A/C-
130U fires at night.  The use of the A/C-130U at night proved critical to the effort 
against Ansar al-Islam (AI), keeping the terrorists fighting all night while the 
Special Forces soldiers and Kurds rested, arriving fresh to fight the following day 
while the enemy had not slept.128  The use of GDI also increased the credibility 
of the Special Forces personnel with the Kurdish fighters.  Confidence in coalition 
air support very likely rallied more peshmerga to the cause, swelling their ranks 
prior to the fight along the Green Line.  Effective GDI, coupled with 
Combined/Joint Special Operations Command-North (C/JSOTF-N) operations 
along the Green line led to the defeat of thirteen Iraqi divisions and prevented the 
Iraqi V Corps from reinforcing Baghdad, likely preventing many potential coalition 
casualties in the process.   
From the Balkans to Iraq, planners found a winning combination in the 
integration of Special Forces and CAS, maximizing the effectiveness of both the 
Special Forces on the ground and the CAS platforms in the air.  Doctrine for 
better employment of CAS evolved between Afghanistan and Iraq, providing 
devastatingly effective results along the Green line.  Special Forces integration 
with conventional ground forces also traces its roots back to the IFOR mission in 
the Balkans.   
 
                                            
127 Findlay, Green, Braganca, “SOF on the Contemporary Battlefield,” pp. 12-14.  
128 Author telephone interview with MAJ Mark Grdovic, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, 
US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS) 30 August 2004. 
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F. SPECIAL FORCES INTEGRATION WITH CONVENTIONAL FORCES  
The first prolonged interaction of Army Special Forces and conventional 
units occurred in the Balkans.  A rocky relationship from the start, both forces 
worked to understand one another and gradually became comfortable working 
together.  In Afghanistan, SOF fought as the main effort and supported force 
during the initial combat operations, not integrating with conventional ground 
units until Operation Anaconda in the spring of 2002.  In Iraq, C/JSOTF-North 
received the attachment of a conventional parachute infantry brigade, while other  
Special Forces elements worked with conventional units in the south.  Although 
Special Forces integration with conventional forces has evolved a great deal in 
nine years, it still has a long way to go.   
When US Special Forces arrived in the Balkans conventional 
commanders met them with little enthusiasm.  Conventional forces considered 
the Special Forces soldiers mavericks, resistant to the concepts of discipline and 
teamwork within the Army.  Likewise, some Special Forces soldiers avoided 
interacting with conventional forces, preferring not to mix with soldiers in normal 
units.  Special Forces and conventional units rarely trained together and 
understood little of each other’s capabilities and limitations.  Moreover, many 
conventional commanders, unfamiliar with Special Forces missions and 
capabilities, distrusted the Special Forces personnel.  William Carty lists some of 
the challenges commonly facing Special Forces integration with conventional 
forces:    
Issues of organizational culture, lack of understanding of roles and 
capabilities, doctrinal shortcomings, and training deficiencies have 
created friction between SOF and conventional forces resulting in 
failures to exploit potential, missed opportunities, and in some 
cases, fatal errors.129 
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Initially utilizing Special Forces as Liaison Coordination Elements (LCEs), 
to assist in the command, control and communications connectivity of Troop 
Contributing Nations (TCNs) to the NATO effort, these conventional commanders 
failed to use their Special Forces personnel to the utmost of their potential.   
As NATO operations in Bosnia transitioned from IFOR to SFOR and 
Special Forces assumed the Joint Commission Observer (JCO) mission from the 
British, conventional commanders witnessed the capabilities and unique 
intelligence perspective provided by the JCO teams as they operated in and 
around the local communities.  Special Forces personnel matured, recognizing 
the need for effective integration within the conventional command structure, co-
locating their SOCCEs with the supported commander and availing themselves 
to the conventional collection plan.   
As JTF-Hawk deployed to Albania, LTG Hendrix, following the advice of 
Gen Meigs, deployed with Special Forces despite not having a mission for them.  
True to form, the Special Forces soldiers found a mission, providing intelligence 
and communications support to the KLA from Albania.  During the KFOR mission 
in Kosovo, the Multinational Brigade-East (MNB-E) commander relied heavily 
upon his Special Forces Liaison Teams (LTs) for intelligence information gained 
while interacting with the local communities.  Finally, the MNB-E commander 
allowed his Special Forces personnel to conduct high-risk operations, such as 
the combined raid with the Russians, a testament to his trust in the SFODAs.   
OEF, initially fought as a special operations ground war, relied heavily 
upon US Army Special Forces at the outset of the campaign, as demonstrated by 
the non-doctrinal, direct reporting chain from Task Force Dagger to the 
Combatant Commander, General Franks.  The spotty performance of the 
Northern Alliance fighters at Tora Bora resulting in the presumed escape of many 
al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters led to the decision to employ conventional coalition 
forces in the spring of 2002 against al-Qaeda in the Shah-i-Kot Valley during in 
Operation Anaconda.  After Anaconda, the war in Afghanistan took on a 
conventional flavor, with Special Forces moving from the supported force to the 
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supporting force.  The establishment of Combined/Joint Task Force-Afghanistan 
(C/JSOTF-AF) and Joint Task Force 180 (JTF-180) marked the shift at which 
point Special Forces came fully under the command and control of conventional 
commanders in Afghanistan.  As COIN became the mission priority for Special 
Forces, the restrictions placed upon their operations and freedom of movement 
by conventional commanders limited their effectiveness. One Special Forces 
officer currently serving in Afghanistan commented,  
The environment we are operating [in] today is extremely limited by 
conventional commanders that do not understand [Special Forces]-
unique capabilities and how to employ them.130   
The current constraints placed upon Special Forces in Afghanistan and 
the complex approval system mandated by conventional commanders for 
mission approval seemingly fails to maximize the use of Special Forces to their 
fullest potential.   
C/JSOTF-North shared a rocky relationship with the 173d ABN BDE right 
from the start.  Attending a planning conference in Italy in January 2003, 
C/JSOTF-North commanders and staff officers met resistance from the officers of 
the 173d ABN BDE over their incorporation into a C/JSOTF.131  Bristling at the 
recommendation from C/JSOTF-North staff officers that they should plan for 
stability and support operations (SASO), the 173d refused, claiming that SASO 
wasn’t a mission for paratroopers.  Although the 173d ABN BDE was OPCON to 
C/JSOTF-North in Iraq, the BDE commander showed little interest in supporting 
C/JSOTF operations.  During OIF the relationship between C/JSOTF-North and 
the 173d ABN BDE showed no improvement despite the dire situation with the 
173d doing little to support C/JSOTF-North.  The 173d ABN BDE ultimately 
                                            
130 Author email correspondence with a Special Forces Major, wishing to remain 
anonymous, 19 August 2004.  This officer currently commands a Special Forces AOB in 
Afghanistan.   
131 Author telephone interview with US Army Major Mark Grdovic, Fort Bragg, North 
Carolina, 30 August 2004.  MAJ Grdovic, a member of C/JSOTF-North, attended the planning 
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arrived to secure the city of Kirkuk, commencing its SASO mission 36 hours after 
the occupation of the city by Special Forces and peshmerga fighters.  All 
interviews conducted reference the friction between C/JSOTF-North and the 
173d ABN BDE indicate the breakdown in integration hinged upon personality 
differences at the command levels. 
As Special Forces and peshmerga fighters occupied the city of Mosul, two 
days after the liberation of Kirkuk, the 101st Airborne Division and the 26th 
Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) moved into the city as the first conventional 
units on the scene.  Having previously worked with the 5th SFG (A), the 101st 
ABN worked well with C/JSOTF-North elements in Mosul. 
The trend seems to demonstrate that in the initial phase of combat, with 
the exception of the experience of C/JSOTF-North with the 173d ABN BDE, 
excellent integration and cooperation existed between Special Forces and 
conventional units.  Crisis forges a team spirit and all forces strive to accomplish 
their missions rapidly and efficiently.  This initial period of combat is also the time 
during which Special Force operate most effectively-in ambiguous situations, 
conducting decentralized operations. 
Why do Special Forces operate more effectively when conducting 
decentralized operations?  The ability to operate in a decentralized manner 
eliminates the necessity to request permission through multiple levels of 
command and maximizes the ability of units to respond rapidly to new or 
perishable information.  Decentralized operations typically allow Special Forces 
to quickly traverse the Observe, Orient, Decide and Act (OODA) loop, disrupting 
the enemy’s decision cycle.132   
A battle against small, independent and mobile formations may 
change too rapidly to allow centralized control in detail.  The lesson 
from Afghanistan is that, with clear mission orders and appropriate 
technology, each tactical element can become a command, control, 
                                            
132 The OODA Loop, developed by John Boyd, models reaction and response to an event.  
A soldier on the ground witnesses an event (Observe); processes what he has just seen (Orient); 
chooses a course of action or response (Decide); and responds (Acts).  If a friendly force can 
complete the OODA Loop more rapidly than the enemy force, their ability to react first will force 
the enemy to change his behavior or course of action.   
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and execution node, greatly shortening the OODA loop while still 
allowing the passing of information on tactical actions and results to 
higher levels for operational and strategic analysis.133   
For example, the ability to immediately mount a follow-on mission based 
on intelligence recovered at an objective allows Special Forces to get ahead of 
the enemy’s decision cycle, keeping the enemy off balance and unable to react 
before the situation changes again.  Shortening the OODA loop increases the 
odds of defeating the enemy. 
As the situation stabilizes and the combat phase ends, conventional 
commanders seem to feel more at ease with the situation and place greater 
restrictions upon the Special Forces personnel, imposing a more centralized 
command approach and lengthening the OODA loop.  These restrictions and the 
centralization of command limit the effectiveness of Special Forces through 
failure to employ them at their optimal level, possibly due to a lack of 
understanding of Special Forces doctrine and capabilities.  The employment of 
Special Forces in the SASO phases of OEF and OIF clearly illustrate this point.   
Evidence also indicates that the relationship between Special Forces and 
conventional units normally improves in direct proportion to the level of the 
echelon at which the relationship occurs.  Analysis of Special Forces operations 
in the Balkans, OEF and OIF demonstrate that Special Forces detachments and 
companies generally maintain positive relations with conventional squads, 
platoons, companies and battalions.  The dynamics of the relationship seem to 
change with an increase in the echelons requiring cooperation.   
These trends in mind, personalities ultimately drive the relationship 
between Special Forces and conventional forces.  The perception of 
conventional commanders towards Special Forces and vice-versa, as well as the 
past experiences of commanders in dealing with Special Forces is the overriding 
factor that will determine the relationship. 
                                            
133 John Jogerst, “What’s So Special About Special Operations?  Lessons from the War in 
Afghanistan,” Aerospace Power Journal, Summer 2002, pp. 2-3.  Available [Online]: 
<http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj02/sum02/jogerst.html> [18 August 2004]. 
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Conventional commanders require more education as to the capabilities 
and limitations of Special Forces and Special Forces soldiers likewise require 
more familiarity with conventional organization, doctrine and operations.  
Although the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) regularly integrates 
Special Forces and conventional units in training, the scenarios may provide an 
unreal expectation of Special Forces capabilities to conventional commanders 
due to the habitual employment of SFODAs as reconnaissance elements 
supporting maneuver brigade headquarters.134  Greater understanding of the 
roles and missions of Special Forces by conventional commanders will foster 
more trust between the two forces, contributing to better integration and 
maximization of capabilities. 
The military requires doctrine to address the integration of Special Force 
and conventional forces.   
The most significant problem with current doctrine and 
recommended employment methods, at the joint and service levels, 
both from the SOF and conventional forces perspectives, is that the 
majority of doctrine and traditional planning has primarily focused 
on coordination and deconfliction of SOF and conventional forces 
assets.  No official reference, traditional training, or formal planning 
framework exist that address true SOF and conventional force 
integration within the theater in any significant detail.135 
Although the relationship has progressed from the Balkans to Afghanistan 
to Iraq, a doctrinal “gap” still exists in the integration of Special Forces and 
conventional units.  Unless identified and addressed by DoD, perception and 
personalities will continue defining the relationship between Special Forces and 
conventional forces in the years to come.   
G. INSTITUTIONALIZATION 
This section analyzes the institutionalization of lessons learned.  
Institutionalization of lessons learned may occur at one of two levels: either in the 
internal training conducted by units, known as the unit level, or at the proponent 
                                            
134 Author telephone interview with US Army Major Mark Grdovic, Fort Bragg, North 
Carolina, 30 August 2004.   
135 Carty, “An Unconventional Look,” pp. 3-4. 
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school, known as the institutional level.  Upon assuming the JCO mission from 
British SOF following the Implementation Force (IFOR) rotation in Bosnia, the 
10th Special Forces Group realized that no doctrine existed for such operations 
and no good handover occurred to familiarize the US soldiers undertaking the 
mission from the British.  As demonstrated in earlier chapters, this caused the US 
Special Forces JCO effort to flounder for the first year after its establishment.  
Only after LTC Charlie Cleveland developed a JCO targeting methodology was 
an informal, on the ground doctrine established, resulting in improved operational  
results.  The 10th Special Forces Group incorporated the JCO targeting 
methodology into unit training to better prepare detachments to assume the JCO 
mission in Bosnia.   
Following the initial combat phase of Operation Enduring Freedom, 
Special Forces units preparing to deploy to Afghanistan to relieve those due to 
rotate out familiarized themselves with the operations of the outgoing units by 
sending Pre-Deployment Site Surveys (PDSS) to gather information and analyze 
all aspects of the situation.  Preparing to deploy to OEF, 2nd Battalion, 7th 
Special Forces Group invited guest speakers with experience in Afghanistan, 
both military and non-military, to share their experiences and lessons learned 
with the entire battalion.136  When preparing to assume the mission of the 
outgoing Special Force elements, the incoming units reviewed after-action 
reviews and lessons learned of the units on the ground in order to focus their 
training and develop tactics, techniques and procedures unique to operational 
environment of Afghanistan.   
Prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, both the 10th SFG (A) and the 5th SFG 
(A) conducted extensive training in preparation for their missions in Iraq.  The 
Special Forces Groups based a significant amount of this training upon lessons 
learned in Operation Enduring Freedom.  The 3rd Battalion, 10th SFG (A) began 
training in August 2002, conducting detailed mission planning exercises, followed 
by mission rehearsal exercises and UW training consisting of interaction with 
                                            
136 Author email correspondence with US Army Major Pete Canonico, dated 01 September 
2004. 
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role-players posing as guerrillas and detailed guerrilla warfare planning 
exercises.137  The 10th SFG (A) based many of the scenarios upon the 
experiences of Special Forces soldiers conducting UW with Northern Alliance 
fighters in OEF as well as the Special Forces experience working with the ethnic 
Kurds in Operation Provide Comfort.  The five active and two reserve Special  
Forces Groups constantly conduct internal after-action reviews at all levels to 
improve performance, modify tactics, techniques and procedures and implement 
lessons learned at the unit level. 
The US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School 
(USAJFKSWCS) is the institutional level for Special Forces.  Headquartered at 
Fort Bragg, NC, USAJFKSWCS is the proponent for Special Forces training, 
conducting the Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC).  The SFQC 
provides entry-level common-core training for perspective Special Forces 
soldiers and specialty training for the officer and each of the Special Forces non-
commissioned officer (NCO) military occupational specialties (MOS).138 
During OEF and OIF Fort Leavenworth, US Special Operations Command 
(USSOCOM) and US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) deployed 
teams of historians to interview Special Forces soldiers, recording the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the operations.  Returning with the historians to their 
respective commands, these historical records, lessons learned, or after-action 
reviews were never disseminated to the USAJFKSWCS.  When asked how 
Special Forces lessons learned arrive at the Directorate of Training and Doctrine 
at USAJFKSWCS and what doctrinal changes may stem from the experiences of 
OEF and OIF, one officer replied:  
                                            
137 Mark Grdovic, “Task Force 103 During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM,” a synopsis of 
training and operations conducted by 3rd Battalion, 10th SFG (A) prior to and during OIF.  
Provided to the author by MAJ Grdovic on 31 August 2004. 
138 The SFQC produces trained Special Forces in 5 MOS’s: the 18A officer MOS; the 18B 
Weapons Sergeant MOS; the 18C Communications Sergeant MOS; 18D Medical Sergeant MOS; 
and 18E Engineer Sergeant MOS.  The SFQC varies in length depending on the particular MOS.   
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The mechanism to collect and disseminate info is non-existent…not 
a single AAR from OIF or OEF has touched the schoolhouse.  Very 
little changes have been implemented.139 
Although few formal lessons learned reach USAJFKSWCS, informal 
lessons learned abound.  The rotation of OEF and OIF veterans as cadre at the 
SFQC allows the officers and NCOs to share their experiences and lessons 
learned in combat directly with students in the various courses.  Combat veteran 
experience has most likely had the greatest impact on adding realism to the two-
week UW scenario students undergo in later phases of training.  Originally 
conceived in the 1950s and built around a rural World War II French Resistance 
model, the UW exercise, codenamed “Robin Sage” places students in a notional 
hostile country to conduct a US-sponsored insurgency to aid guerrillas in 
overthrowing an existing government.  Striving to make the training as realistic as 
possible, the SFQC sought out Special Forces OEF and OIF veterans with real-
world UW experience to serve as role players and evaluators for students in the 
Robin Sage exercise and adding urban operations to the UW scenario based 
upon the operational environments in Afghanistan and Iraq.140  Further 
modification to the SFQC POI may occur in the near future.    
Institutionalization of experiences and lessons learned occurs more 
frequently at the unit level rather than at the proponent school level.  Units can 
more rapidly change or modify training to meet mission-specific requirements, 
where the USAJFKSWCS must change doctrine and develop formal programs of 
instruction (POI) to add new material to the courses being taught, facing the 
additional challenge of providing the broad instruction to soldiers destined for all 
of the Special Forces Groups, rather than just one.  The institutionalization of 
experiences and lessons learned will most likely occur at the school but it will 
take time.    
                                            
139 Author email correspondence with a US Army Special Forces officer wishing to remain 
anonymous, dated 1 September 2004.  This officer is assigned to the USAJFKSWCS.     
140 Author telephone interview with US Army Major Patrick Marques, 23 March 2004.  MAJ 
Marques commanded Company F, 1st Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne) 
from 2001 to 2002.  Company F conducts training for the SFQC, including the Robin Sage UW 
scenario.   
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Special Forces evolved significantly from their initial employment in the 
Balkans to SASO operations in Iraq.  Demonstrating their value in Bosnia and 
Kosovo, Special Forces slowly gained the trust of conventional commanders, 
providing liaisons with troop contributing nations and intelligence.  In Kosovo, 
Special Forces conducted higher risk missions including support to the KLA and 
demobilization of former guerrilla forces.  Following the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001 Special Forces provided the first boots on the ground in 
Afghanistan for DoD, leading an indigenous force to topple the existing regime, 
followed by COIN operations in support of the new government.  Finally in Iraq, 
Special Forces conducted UW to destroy a terrorist safehaven and disrupt and 
defeat 13 conventional Iraqi divisions along the Green Line in northern Iraq, while 
conducting successful area denial in the west.  Throughout all of these 
operations the intelligence operations, UW and FID operations, employment of 
CAS, integration with conventional units and institutionalization of lessons 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A. EVOLUTION AND THE FUTURE OF SPECIAL FORCES 
Operations in the Balkans, beginning in 1995, marked the most significant 
change in Special Forces employment since Operation Desert Shield/Desert 
Storm.  The interaction of Special Forces with conventional forces demonstrated 
their capabilities and value to commanders, ultimately changing the mindset of 
the latter and laying the foundation for greater integration.  Special Forces also 
matured internally, growing more comfortable working with conventional forces 
and integrating into the command structure through proactive liaison and 
command and control elements.  Building upon lessons learned in the Balkans in 
the areas of intelligence operations, foreign internal defense (FID), employment 
of close air support, coupled with the most extensive incorporation into the 
conventional force planning structure ever, Special Forces conducted successful 
combat operations followed by stability and support operations (SASO) in 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan in 2001.  Commencing 
planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in the summer of 2002, Special 
Forces applied the lessons learned from Afghanistan to combat operations and 
SASO in Iraq. 
How will the future operating environment dictate the employment of 
Special Forces?  Special Forces will very likely continue at the forefront of the 
Global War on Terror (GWOT) for several reasons.  As few countries in the world 
pose a substantial conventional threat to the US, future conflicts will likely be 
small in scope, characterized by guerrilla or other asymmetric warfare which 
large mechanized or armored conventional US units will be unlikely suited to 
fight.141  Special Forces provide policymakers with a flexible response option 
capable of conducting unconventional warfare (UW) or counterinsurgency 
(COIN) for prolonged periods in austere environments with little support.  Next, to 
effectively respond to the asymmetric threat posed by terrorism, the US must                                             
141 Thomas E. Ricks, “Shift from Traditional War Seen at Pentagon,” Washington Post, (3 
September 2004), p. 1. Available [Online]: 
<http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20040903327365.html> [3 September 2004]. 
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maintain the capability to respond rapidly to actionable intelligence with an agile, 
lethal special operations forces (SOF), including Special Forces.  The consistent 
emphasis on the integration of technology into Special Forces operations will 
also continue improving the effectiveness of Special Forces Operational 
Detachment-Alphas (SFODAs) on the battlefield.  Finally, the ability of Special 
Forces elements to leverage technology to conduct decentralized operations, 
rapidly reacting to targets of opportunity based upon intelligence, will continue 
making them a force of choice in the future.142    
Are we currently employing Special Forces in roles that maximize their 
effectiveness?  Based upon the evolution from the Balkans to Iraq, current 
Special Forces missions in support of the GWOT emphasize unilateral 
operations such as direct action (DA) or COIN, rather than operations with the 
indigenous forces.  According to several Special Forces officers, conventional 
commanders insist upon employing Special Forces exclusively in DA or COIN 
missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, rather than focusing their efforts on operations 
with the host nation forces.143  
[The new Iraqi military forces are] trained by unskilled trainers 
(PFCs in some cases) and no advisors to hold it all together…but 
we [Special Forces] have never been given (or asked) for the 
mission to establish new [Iraqi] forces and advise them.  Some in 
the community are enamored with our new unilateral capability.  
We have become locked on Kill or Capture as a mission statement.  
That’s not what we are doing and not what is needed no matter 
how offensive it sounds.  The Kill or Capture charter has led to 
chasing bad guys (and subsequently making more).144 
The employment of Special Forces to conduct unilateral missions by 
conventional commanders as well as Special Forces commanders may ultimately 
work to the detriment of the force.  In order for COIN to be as effective as 
                                            
142 John Jogerst, “What’s So Special About Special Operations?  Lessons from the War in 
Afghanistan,” Aerospace Power Journal, Summer 2002, pp. 3-4.  Available [Online]: 
<http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj02/sumo2/jogerst.html> [18 August 2004]. 
143 Author email correspondence with a US Army Special Forces Major wishing to remain 
anonymous, 19 August 2004.  This officer currently commands an AOB in Afghanistan.   
144 Author email correspondence with a US Army Special Forces Major wishing to remain 
anonymous, 1 September 2004.  This officer served in Iraq during OEF.     
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possible it must be conducted by, with or through indigenous forces in order to 
foster a sense of responsibility in the host nation government and ultimately 
make the military self-sufficient in executing the mission.145  The reliance upon 
contractors in Afghanistan and conventional Army units in Iraq to conduct the 
training for the new military forces in each country, as well as the insistence of 
conventional and Special Forces commanders for the conduct of unilateral 
missions squanders an opportunity for Special Forces soldiers to maintain a 
long-lasting advisory relationship with these forces and mold them effectively.   
As the GWOT develops in the future, the US will likely pursue foreign 
policy options focused upon the prevention of conditions that might potentially 
foster the creation of or support terrorist groups.  Recognizing that these efforts 
will require the application of the diplomatic, informational, military and economic 
resources of the US, the military effort will very likely include the employment of 
Special Forces in key regions to train US allies in the GWOT.146  Anticipating this 
requirement in the future, commanders at all levels, in both the conventional and 
special operations communities, must avoid the temptation of unilateral Special 
Forces employment and continue building upon the core FID tasks of providing 
organization, training, advice and assistance to host nation forces.  In order to 
maximize their effectiveness, Special Forces must maintain proficiency in all five 
doctrinal missions to continue providing a flexible response option anywhere 
along the operational continuum in any part of the world.   
Although future battlefields may not be similar to the SOF-centric fight in 
Afghanistan or witness the employment of Special Forces on the scale of 
C/JSOTF-North in OEF, future Special Forces operations will very likely trace 
their lessons learned and validations to OEF and OIF.  Unlike any other conflict 
                                            
145 Joint Publication 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal 
Defense (FID), (30 April 2004), p. I-14.  Available [Online]: 
<http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_07_1.pdf> [19 August 2004].   
146 “Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) at War,” United States Army Special 
Operations Command (USASOC) National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) Symposium 
Briefing, (5 February 2003), Slide 5.  15th Annual NDIA SO/LIC (Special Operations/Low-Intensity 
Conflict Symposium and Exhibition, Washington, D.C., February 2004.  Available [Online]: 
<http:www.dtic.mil/ndia/2004solic/usasoc2.pdf> [7 August 2004]. 
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since Vietnam, the GWOT has involved Special Forces soldiers from each of the 
five active duty Groups and two National Guard Groups.  Lessons learned and 
new doctrine developed based upon experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq will 
likely have a substantial impact on future Special Forces operations.  Ongoing 
operations and the employment of all Groups in the GWOT also allow 
experiences gained in the operations to trickle down to a wider audience than 
any operation prior to OEF.   
Institutionalization of lessons learned, however effective at the unit level, 
must be incorporated into the Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC), 
ensuring that current doctrine changes to incorporate the lessons learned from 
Afghanistan and Iraq and that soldiers receive the best possible preparation  
prior to operational assignments to the Special Forces Groups.  One possible 
area of improvement based upon current SASO missions in Iraq and Afghanistan 
could be greater emphasis upon COIN planning considerations and execution in 
permissive and semi-permissive environments. 
In conclusion, although policymakers and military commanders have 
made great progress in improving the employment of Special Forces since the 
early days of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Implementation 
Force (IFOR) in Bosnia, through OEF in Afghanistan and OIF in Iraq, they must 
learn from the past in order to utilize Special Forces more responsibly in the 
future. 
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